Houston v. Moore (1820)

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Houston v. Moore, 1820

[The immediate issue in this case was federal and state jurisdiction to try noncompliance with militia orders. The context provides much enlightenment on the militia institution. Militia duty was conscript duty. Militiamen were governed by the rules and articles of war. The Militia Acts were the precursors of the selective service acts of the twentieth century. There was NO mention of a "personal right" to be armed outside of lawful authority. Houston v. Moore is provided here for further enlightenment to interested parties as Appendix W to US v. Emerson. It was not included in the appendices provided to the Fifth Circuit.]

Part 1: statement of the case; arguments of plaintiff and defendant.
Part 2: opinion of Justice Bushrod Washington
Part 3: opinion of Justice William Johnson.

Part 4: opinion of Justice Joseph Story. THIS FILE.

[fotenotes reordered as endnotes]
Mr. JUSTICE STORY. The only question which is cognizable by this court upon this voluminous record, arises from a very short paragraph in the close of the bill of exceptions. It there appears that the plaintiff prayed the State Court of Common Pleas to instruct the jury, that the first, second and third paragraphs of the 21st section of the statute of Pennsylvania of the 28th of March, 1814, "so far as they related to the militia called into the service of the United States, under the laws of Congress, and who failed to obey the orders of the President of the United States, are contrary to the constitution of the United States and the laws of Congress made in pursuance thereof, and, are, therefore, null and void. The court instructed the jury that these paragraphs were not contrary to the constitution or laws of the United States, and were, therefore, not null and void." This opinion has been affirmed [48] by the highest state tribunal of Pennsylvania, and judgment has been there pronounced in pursuance of it in favor of the defendant. The cause stands before us upon a writ of error from this last judgment; and the naked question for us to decide is, whether the paragraphs alluded to are repugnant to the constitution or laws of the United States; if so, the judgment must be reversed; if otherwise, it ought to be affirmed.

Questions of this nature are always of great importance and delicacy. They involve interests of so much magnitude, and of such deep and permanent public concern, that they cannot but be approached with uncommon anxiety. The sovereignty of a state in the exercise of its legislation is not to be impaired, unless it be clear that it has transcended its legitimate authority; nor ought any power to be sought, much less to be adjudged, in favor of the United States, unless it be clearly within the reach of its constitutional charter. Sitting here, we are not at liberty to add one jot of power to the national government beyond what the people have granted by the constitution; and, on the other hand, we are bound to support that constitution as it stands, and to give a fair and rational scope to all the powers which it clearly contains.

The constitution containing a grant of powers in many instances similar to those already existing in the state governments, and some of these being of vital importance also to state authority and state legislation, it is not to be admitted that a mere grant of such powers in affirmative terms to Congress, does, per se, [49] transfer an exclusive sovereignty on such subjects to the latter. On the contrary, a reasonable interpretation of that instrument necessarily leads to the conclusion that the powers so granted are never exclusive of similar powers existing in the states, unless where the constitution has expressly, in terms, given an exclusive power to Congress, or the exercise of a like power is prohibited to the states, or there is a direct repugnancy or incompatibility in the exercise of it by the states. The example of the first class is to be found in the exclusive legislation delegated to Congress over places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the state in which the same shall be, for forts, arsenals, dock-yards, &C; of the second class, the prohibition of a state to coin money or emit bills of credit; of the third class, as this court have already held, the power to establish an uniform rule of naturalization. 1 and the delegation of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. 2 In all other cases not falling within the classes already mentioned, it seems unquestionable that the states retain concurrent authority with Congress, not only upon the letter and spirit of the eleventh amendment of the constitution, but upon the soundest principles of general reasoning. There is this reserve, however, that in cases of concurrent authority, where the laws of the states and of the Union are in direct and manifest collision on the same subject, those of the Union being "the supreme law of [50] the land," are of paramount authority, and the state laws, so far, and so far only, as such incompatibility exists, must necessarily yield.

Such are the general principles by which my judgment is guided in every investigation on constitutional points. I do not know that they have ever been seriously doubted. They commend themselves by their intrinsic equity, and have been amply justified by the opinions of the great men under whose guidance the constitution was framed, as well as by the practice of the government of the Union. To desert them would be to deliver ourselves over to endless doubts and difficulties; and probably to hazard the existence of the constitution itself. With these principles in view, let the question now before the court be examined.

The constitution declares that Congress shall have power "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;" and "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service of the United States, reserving to the states respectively the appointment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."

It is almost too plain for argument, that the power here given to Congress over the militia is of a limited nature, and confined to the objects specified in these clauses; and that in all other respects, and for all other purposes, the militia are subject to the control and government of the state authorities. Nor can the reservation to the states of the appointment [51] of the officers and authority of the training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress, be justly considered as weakening this conclusion. That reservation constitutes an exception merely from the power given to Congress "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia"; and is a limitation upon the authority, which would otherwise have devolved upon it as to the appointment of officers. But the exception from a given power cannot, upon any fair reasoning, be considered as an enumeration of all the powers which belong to the states over the militia. What those powers are must depend upon their own constitution; and what is not taken away by the constitution of the United States, must be considered as retained by the states or the people. The exception, then ascertains only that Congress have not, and that the states have, the power to appoint the officers of the militia, and to train them according to the discipline prescribed by Congress. Nor does it seem necessary to contend that the power "to provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia" is exclusively vested in Congress. It is merely an affirmative power, and if not in its own nature incompatible with the existence of a like power in the states, it may well leave a concurrent power in the latter. But when once Congress has carried this power into effect, its laws for the organization, arming, and discipline of the militia, are the supreme law of the land; and all interfering state regulations must necessarily be suspended in their operation. It would certainly seem reasonable, that in the absence of all interfering pro- [52]visions by Congress on the subject, the states should have authority to organize, arm, and discipline their own militia. The general authority retained by them over the militia would seem to draw after it these, as necessary incidents. If Congress should not have exercised its own power, how, upon any other construction than that of a concurrent power, could the states sufficiently provide for their own safety against domestic insurrections, or the sudden invasion of a foreign enemy? They are expressly prohibited from keeping troops or ships of war in time of peace; and this, undoubtedly, upon the supposition, that in such cases the militia would be their natural and sufficient defense. Yet what would the militia be without organization, arms, and discipline? It is certainly not compulsory upon Congress to exercise its own authority upon this subject. The time, the mode, and the extent, must rest upon its means and sound discretion. If, therefore, the present case turned upon the question, whether a state might organize, arm, and discipline its own militia in the absence of, or subordinate to, the regulations of Congress, I am certainly not prepared to deny the legitimacy of such an exercise of authority. It does not seem repugnant in its nature to the grant of a like paramount authority to Congress; and if not, then it is retained by the states. The fifth [sic] amendment to the constitution, declaring that "a well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed," may not, perhaps, be thought to have any important bearing on this point. If [53] it have, it confirms and illustrates, rather than impugns, the reasoning already suggested.

But Congress have also the power to provide "for governing such part of the militia as may be employed in the service of the United States." It has not been attempted in argument to establish that this power is not exclusively in Congress, or that the states have a concurrent power of governing their own militia when in the service of the Union. On the contrary, the reverse has been conceded both here and before the other tribunals, in which this cause has been so ably and learnedly discussed. And there certainly are the strongest reasons for this construction. When the militia is called into the actual service of the United States, by which I understand actual employment in service, the constitution declares that the President shall be the commander-in-chief. The militia of several states may, at the same time, be called out for the public defense; and to suppose each state could have an authority to govern its own militia in such cases, even subordinate to the regulations of Congress, seems utterly inconsistent with that unity of command and action on which the success of all military operations must essentially depend. There never could be a stronger case put from the argument of public inconvenience, against the adoption of such a doctrine. It is scarcely possible that any interference, however small, of a state under such circumstances in the government of the militia, would not materially embarrass, and directly, or indirectly, impugn the authority of the Union. In most cases there would be an utter [54] repugnancy. It would seem, therefore, that a rational interpretation must construe this power as exclusive in its own nature, and belonging solely to Congress.

The remaining clause gives Congress power "to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions." Does this clause vest in Congress an exclusive power, or leave to the states a concurrent power to enact laws for the same purposes? This is an important question, bearing directly on the case before us, and deserves serious deliberation. The plaintiff contends that the power is exclusive in Congress; the defendant, that it is not.

In considering this question, it is always to be kept in view that the case is not of a new power granted to Congress where no similar power already existed in the states. On the contrary, the states, in virtue of their sovereignty, possessed general authority over their own militia; and the constitution carved out of that a specific power in certain enumerated cases. But the grant of such a power is not necessarily exclusive, unless the retaining of a concurrent power by the states be clearly repugnant to the grant. It does not strike me that there is any repugnancy in such concurrent power in the states. Why may not a state call forth its own militia in aid of the United States, to execute the laws of the Union, or suppress insurrections, or repel invasions? It would certainly seem fit that a state might so do, where the insurrection or invasion is within its own territory, and directed against its own existence or authority; and yet these are cases to which the [55] power of Congress pointedly applies. And the execution of the laws of the Union within its territory may not be less vital to its rights and authority than the suppression of a rebellion, or the repulse of an enemy. I do not say that a state may call forth, or claim under its own command, that portion of its militia which the United States have already I called forth, and hold employed in actual service. There would be a repugnancy in the exercise of such an authority under such circumstances. But why may it not call forth, and employ the rest of its militia in aid of the United States, for the constitutional purposes? It could not clash with the exercise of the authority confided to Congress: and yet that it must necessarily clash, with it in all cases, is the sole ground upon which the authority of Congress can be deemed exclusive. I am not prepared to assert that a concurrent power is not retained by the states to provide for the calling forth its own militia as auxiliary to the power of Congress in the enumerated cases. The argument of the plaintiff is, that when a power is granted to Congress to legislate in specific cases, for purposes growing out of the Union, the natural conclusion is that the power is designed to be exclusive; that the power is to be exercised for the good of the whole, by the will of the whole, and consistent with the interests of the whole; and that these objects can nowhere be so clearly seen, or so thoroughly weighed as in Congress, where the whole nation is represented. But the argument proves too much; and pursued to its full extent, it would establish that all the powers granted to Congress are exclusive, un- [56] less where concurrent authority is expressly reserved to the states. But assuming the states to possess a concurrent power on this subject, still the principal difficulty remains to be considered. It is conceded on all sides, and is, indeed, beyond all reasonable doubt, that all state laws on this subject are subordinate to those constitutionally enacted by Congress, and that if there be any conflict or repugnancy between them, the state laws to that extent are inoperative and void. And this brings us to a consideration of the actual legislation of Congress, and of Pennsylvania, as to the point in controversy.

In the execution of the power to provide for the calling forth of the militia, it cannot well be denied that Congress may pass laws to make its call effectual, to punish disobedience to its call, to erect tribunals for the trial of offenders, and to direct the modes of proceeding to enforce the penalties attached to such disobedience. In its very essence, too, the offense created by such laws must be an offense exclusively against the United States, since it grows solely out of the breach of duties due to the United States, in virtue of its positive legislation. To deny the authority of Congress to legislate to this extent, would be to deny that it had authority to make all laws necessary and proper to carry a given power into execution; to require the end, and yet deny the only means adequate to attain that end. Such a construction of the constitution is wholly inadmissible.

The authority of Congress being then unquestionable, let us see to what extent and in what manner it has been exercised. By [57] the act of the 28th of February, 1795, ch. 101, Congress have provided for the calling forth of the militia in the cases enumerated in the constitution. The first section provides, "that whenever the United States shall be invaded, or be in imminent danger of invasion from any foreign nation, or Indian tribe, it shall be lawful for the President of the United States to call forth such number of the militia of the state or states, most convenient to the place of danger, or scene of action, as he may judge necessary to repel such invasion, and to issue his orders for that purpose to such officer or officers of the militia as he shall think proper. It then proceeds to make a provision, substantially the same, in cases of domestic insurrections; and in like manner, the second section proceeds to provide for cases where the execution of the laws is opposed or obstructed by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. The fourth section provides, that "the militia employed in the service of the United States shall be subject to the same rules and articles of war as the troops of the United States." The fifth section (which is very material to our present purpose) provides, "that every officer, noncommissioned officer, or private of the militia, who shall fail to obey any of the orders of the President of the United States, in the cases before recited, shall forfeit a sum not exceeding one year�s pay, and not less than one month�s pay, to be determined and adjudged by a court-martial; and such officer shall, moreover, be liable to be cashiered by a sen- [58] tence of a court-martial, and be incapacitated from holding a commission in the militia for a term not exceeding twelve months, at the discretion of the said court; and such non-commissioned officers and privates shall be liable to be imprisoned by a like sentence, on failure of payment of the fines adjudged against them, for one calendar month for every five dollars of such fine." The sixth section declares, "that courts-martial for the trial of militia, shall be composed of militia officers only." The seventh and eighth sections provide for the collection of the fines by the marshal and deputies, and for the payment of them when collected into the treasury of the United States.

The 2d section of the militia act of Pennsylvania, passed the 28th of March, 1814, provides, "that if any commissioned officer of the militia shall have neglected, or refused to serve, when called into actual service in pursuance of any order or requisition of the President of the United States, he shall be liable to the penalties defined in time act of Congress of the United States, passed on the 28th of February, 1795," and then proceeds to enumerate them; and then declares, "that each and every non-commissioned officer and private, who shall have neglected or refused to serve when called into actual service in pursuance of an order or requisition of the President of the United States, shall be liable to the penalties defined in the same act," and then proceeds to enumerate them. And to each clause is added, "or shall be liable to any penalty which may have been prescribed since the date of the passage of the said act, or which may hereafter be prescribed [59] by any law of the United States." It then further provides, that "within one month after the expiration of the time for which any detachment of militia shall have been called into the service of the United States, by, or in pursuance of orders from the President of the United States, the proper brigade inspector shall summon a general, or a regimental court-martial, as the case may be, for the trial of such person or persons belonging to the detachment called out, who shall have refused or neglected to march therewith, or to furnish a sufficient substitute, or who, after having marched therewith, shall have returned without leave from his commanding officer, of which delinquents, the proper brigade inspector shall furnish to the said court-martial an accurate list. And as soon as the said court-martial shall have decided in each of the cases which shall be submitted to their consideration, the president thereof shall furnish to the marshal of the United States, or to his deputy, and also to the comptroller of the treasury of the United States, a list of the delinquents fined, in order that the further proceedings directed to be had thereon by the laws of the United States may be completed."

It is apparent, from this summary, that each of the acts in question has in view the same objects— the punishment of any persons belonging to the militia of the state, who shall be called forth into the service of the United States by the President, and refuse to perform their duty. Both inflict the same penalties for the same acts of disobedience. In the act of 1795, it is the failure "to obey the orders of the President in any of the cases before [60] recited;" and those orders are such as he is authorized to give by the first and second sections of the act, viz., to "call forth" the militia to execute the laws, to suppress insurrections and repel invasions. In the act of Pennsylvania, it is the neglect or refusal "to serve when called into actual service, in pursuance of any orders of the President," which orders can only be under the act of 1795. And to demonstrate this construction more fully, the delinquent is made liable to the penalties defined in the same act; and this, again, is followed by a clause varying the penalties so as to conform to those which from time to time may be inflicted by the laws of the United States for the same offense. So that there can be no reasonable doubt that the legislature of Pennsylvania meant to punish by its own courts-martial an offense against the United States created by their laws, by a substantial re-enactment of those laws in its own militia code.

No doubt has been here breathed of the constitutionality of the provisions of the act of 1795, and they are believed to be, in all respects, within the legitimate authority of Congress. In the construction, however, of this act, the parties are at variance. The plaintiff contends, that from the time of the calling forth of the militia by the President, it is to be considered as "ipso facto" "employed in the service of the United States," within the meaning of the constitution, and the act of 1795; and, therefore, to be exclusively governed by Congress. On the other hand, the defendant contends, that there is no distinction between the "calling forth," and the "employment in service" [61] of the militia, in the act of 1795, both meaning actual mustering in service, or an effectual calling into service; that the states retain complete authority over the militia, notwithstanding the call of the President, until it is obeyed by going into service; that the exclusive authority of the United States does not commence until the drafted troops are mustered, and in the actual pay and service of the Union; and further, that the act of 1795 was never intended, by its language, to apply its penalties, except to militia in the latter predicament, leaving disobedience to the President's call to be punished by the states as an offense against state authority.

Upon the most mature reflection, it is my opinion that there is a sound distinction between the "calling forth" of the militia, and their being in the "actual service" or "employment" of the United States, contemplated both in the constitution and acts of Congress. The constitution, in the clause already adverted to, enables Congress to provide for the government of such part of the militia "as may be employed in the service of the United States," and makes the President commander-in-chief of the militia, "when called into the actual service of the United States." If the former clause included the authority in Congress to call forth the militia, as being in virtue of the call of the President in actual service, there would certainly be no necessity for a distinct clause, authorizing it to provide for the calling forth of the militia; and the President would be commander-in-chief, not merely of the militia in actual service, but of the militia ordered [62] into service. The acts of Congress, also, aid the construction already asserted. The 4th section of the act of 1795 makes the militia "employed in the service of the United States" subject to the rules and articles of war; and these articles include capital punishments by courts-martial. Yet one of the amendments (art. 5) to the constitution prohibits such punishments, "unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces," or in "the militia when in actual service, in time of war, or public danger." To prevent, therefore, a manifest breach of the constitution, we cannot but suppose that Congress meant (what, indeed, its language clearly imports), in the 4th section, to provide only for cases of actual employment. The act of the 2d of January, 1795, ch. 74, provides for the pay of the militia "when called into actual service," commencing it on the day of their appearance at the place of rendezvous, and allowing a certain pay for every fifteen miles travel from their homes to that place. The 97th article of the rules and articles of war (act of 10th of April, 1806, ch. 20) declares, that the officers and soldiers of any troops, whether militia or others, being mustered, and in the pay of the United States, shall, at all times, and in all places, "when joined, or acting in conjunction with the regular forces" of the United States, be governed by these articles, and shall be subject to be tried by courts-martial, in like manner with the officers and soldiers in the regular forces, save only that such courts-martial shall be composed entirely of militia officers. And the act of the [63] 18th of April, 1814, ch. 141, supplementary to that of 1795, provides for like courts-martial for the trial of militia, drafted, detached, and called forth for the service of the United States, "whether acting in conjunction with the regular forces or otherwise." All these provisions for the government, payment, and trial of the militia, manifestly contemplate that the militia are in actual employment and in service, and not merely that they have been "called forth," or ordered forth, and had failed to obey the orders of the President. It would seem almost absurd to say that these men who have performed no actual service are yet to receive pay; that they are "employed" when they refuse to be employed in the public service; that they are "acting" in conjunction with the regular forces or otherwise, when they are not embodied to act at all; or that they are subject to the rules and articles of war as troops organized and employed in the public service, when they have utterly disclaimed all military organization and obedience. In my judgment, there are the strongest reasons to believe, that by employment "in the service," or, as it is sometimes expressed, "in the actual service" of the United States, something more must be meant than a mere calling forth of the militia. That it includes some acts of organization, mustering, or marching done or recognized, in obedience to the call in the public service. The act of 1795 is not in its terms compulsive upon any militia to serve, but contemplates an option in the person drafted, to serve or not to serve; and if he pay the penalty inflicted by the [64] law, he does not seem bound to perform any military duties.

Besides, the terms "call forth" and "employed in service," cannot, in any appropriate sense, be said to be synonymous. To suppose them used to signify the same thing in the constitution, and acts of Congress, would be to defeat the obvious purposes of both. The constitution, in providing for the calling forth of the militia, necessarily supposes some act to be done before the actual employment of the militia; a requisition to perform service, a call to engage in a public duty. From the very nature of things, the call must precede the service; and to confound them is to break down the established meaning of language, and to render nugatory a power without which the militia can never be compelled to serve in defense of the Union. For of what constitutional validity can the act of 1795 be, if the sense be not what I have stated? If Congress cannot provide for a preliminary call, authorizing and requiring the service, how can it punish disobedience to that call? The argument that endeavors to establish such a proposition is utterly without any solid foundation. We do not sit here to fritter away the constitution upon metaphysical subtleties.

Nor is it true that the act of 1795 confines its penalties to such of the militia as are in actual service, leaving those who refuse to comply with the orders of the President to the punishment that the state may choose to inflict for disobedience. On the contrary, if there be any certainty in language, the 5th section applies exclusively to those of the militia who [65] are "called forth" by the President, and fail to obey his orders, or, in other words, who refuse to go into the actual service of the United States. It inflicts no penalty in any other case; and it supposes, and justly, that all the cases of disobedience of the militia, while in actual service, were sufficiently provided for by the 4th section of the act, they being thereby subjected to the rules and articles of war. It inflicts the penalty, too, as we have already seen, in the identical cases, and none other, to which the paragraphs of the militia act of Pennsylvania now in question pointedly address themselves; and in the identical case for which the present plaintiff was tried, convicted and punished, by the state court-martial. So that if the defendant's construction of the act of 1795 could prevail, it would not help his case. All the difficulties as to the repugnancy between the act of Congress and of Pennsylvania, would still remain, with the additional difficulty, that the court would be driven to say, that the mere act of calling forth put the militia, ipso facto, into actual service, and so placed them exclusively under the government of Congress.

In the remarks which have already been made, the answer to another proposition stated by the defendant is necessarily included. The offense to which the penalties are annexed in the 4th section of the act of 1795, is not an offense against state authority, but against the United states, created by a law of Congress, in virtue of a constitutional authority, and punishable by a tribunal which it has selected, and which it can change at its pleasure. [66]

That tribunal is a court-martial; and the defendant contends, that as no explanatory terms are added, a state court-martial is necessarily intended, because the laws of the Union have not effectually created any court-martial, which, sitting under the authority of the United States, can in all cases try the offense. It will at once be seen that the act of 1795 has not expressly delegated cognizance of the offense to a state court-martial, and the question naturally arises, in what manner, then, can it be claimed? When a military offense is created by an act of Congress to be punished by a court-martial, how is such an act to be interpreted? If a similar clause were in a state law, we should be at no loss to give an immediate and definite construction to it, viz., that it pointed to a state court-martial and why? Because the offense being created by state legislation, to be executed for state purposes, must be supposed to contemplate in its execution such tribunals as the state may erect, and control, and confer jurisdiction upon. A state legislature cannot be presumed to legislate as to foreign tribunals; but must be supposed to speak in reference to those which may be reached by its own sovereignty. Precisely the same reason must apply to the construction of a law of the United States. The object of the law being to provide for the exercise of a power vested in Congress by the constitution, whatever is directed to be done must be supposed to be done, unless the contrary be expressed, under the authority of the Union. When, then, a court-martial is spoken of in general terms in the act of 1795, [67] the reasonable interpretation is, that it is a court-martial to be organized under the authority of the United States — court-martial whom Congress may convene and regulate. There is no pretense to say that Congress can compel a state court martial to convene and sit in judgment on such offense. Such an authority is nowhere confided to it by the constitution. Its power is limited to the few cases already specified, and these, most assuredly do not embrace it; for it is not an implied power necessary or proper to carry into effect the given power. The nation may organize its own tribunals for this purpose; and it has no necessity to resort to other tribunals to enforce its rights. If it do not choose to organize such tribunals, it is its own fault; but it is not, therefore, imperative upon a state tribunal to volunteer in its service. The 6th section of the same act comes in aid of this most reasonable construction. It declares that courts-martial for the trial of militia shall be composed of militia officers only, which plainly shows that it supposed that regular troops and officers were in the same service; and yet, it is as plain that this provision would be superfluous, if state courts-martial were solely intended, since the states do not keep, and ordinarily have no authority to keep, regular troops, but are bound to confine themselves to militia. It might with as much propriety be contended that the courts-martial for the trial of militia under the 97th article of the rules and articles of war, are to be state courts-martial. The language of that article, so far as respects this point, is almost the [68] same with the clause now under consideration.

As to the argument itself, upon which the defendant erects his construction of this part of the act, its solidity is not admitted. It does not follow, because Congress have neglected to provide adequate means to enforce their laws, that a resulting trust is reposed in the state tribunals to enforce them. If an offense be created of which no court of the United States has a vested cognizance, the state court may not, therefore, assume jurisdiction, and punish it. It cannot be pretended that the states have retained any power to enforce fines and penalties created by the laws of the United States in virtue of their general sovereignty, for that sovereignty did not originally attach on such subjects. They sprung from the Union, and had no previous existence. It would be a strange anomaly in our national jurisprudence to hold the doctrine, that because a new power created by the constitution of the United States was not exercised to its full extent, therefore the states might exercise it by a sort of process in aid. For instance, because Congress decline "to borrow money on the credit of the United States," or "to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court," or "to make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces, "or exercise either of them defectively, that a state might step in, and by its legislation supply those defects, or assume a general jurisdiction on these subjects. If, therefore, it be conceded, that Congress have not as yet legislated to the extent of organizing courts-martial for the trial of offenses created by the act of 1795, it is not conceded that there- [69] fore state courts-martial may, in virtue of state laws, exercise the authority, and punish offenders. Congress may hereafter supply such defects, and cure all inconveniences.

It is a general principle, too, in the policy, if not the customary law of nations, that no nation is bound to enforce the penal laws of another within its own dominions. The authority naturally belongs, and is confided, to the tribunals of the nation creating the offenses. In a government formed like ours, where there is a division of sovereignty, and, of course, where there is a danger of collision from the near approach of powers to a conflict with each other, it would seem a peculiarly safe and salutary rule, that which government should be left to enforce its own penal laws in its own tribunals. It has been expressly held, by this court, that no part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States can consistently with the constitution be delegated by Congress to state tribunals; 3 and there is not the slightest inclination to retract that opinion. The judicial power of the Union clearly extends to all such cases. No concurrent power is retained by the states, because the subject-matter derives its existence from the constitution; and the authority of Congress to delegate it cannot be implied, for it is not necessary or proper in any constitutional sense. But even if Congress could delegate it, it would still remain to be shown that it had so done. [70] We, have seen that this cannot be correctly deduced from the act of 1795; and we are, therefore, driven to decide, whether a state can, without such delegation, constitutionally assume and exercise it.

It is not, however, admitted, that the laws of the United States have not enabled courts-martial to be held under their own authority for the trial of these offenses, at least when there are militia officers acting in service in conjunction with regular troops. The 97th article of war gives an authority for the trial of militia in many cases; and the act of the 18th of April, 1814, ch. 141 (which has now expired), provided, as we have already seen, for cases where the militia was acting alone. To what extent these laws applied is not now necessary to be determined. The subject is introduced solely to prevent any conclusion that they are deemed to be wholly inapplicable. Upon the whole, I am of opinion that the courts-martial intended by the act of 1795 are not state courts-martial, but those of the United States; and this is the same construction which has been already put upon the same act by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 4

What, then, is the state of the case before the court? Congress, by a law, declare that the officers and privates of the militia who shall, when called forth by the President, fail to obey his orders, shall be liable to certain penalties, to be adjudged by a court-martial convened under its own authority. The legislature of Pennsylvania inflict the same penalties [71] for the same disobedience, and direct these penalties to be adjudged by a state court-martial called exclusively under its own authority. The offense is created by a law of the United States, and is solely against their authority, and made punishable in a specific manner; the legislature of Pennsylvania, without the assent of the United States, insist upon being an auxiliary, nay, as the defendant contends, a principal, if not a paramount, sovereign, in its execution. This is the real state of the case; and it is said, without the slightest disrespect for the legislature of Pennsylvania, who, in passing this act, were, without question, governed by the highest motive of patriotism, public honor, and fidelity to the Union. If it has transcended its legitimate authority, it has committed an unintentional error, which it will be the first to repair, and the last to vindicate. Our duty compels us, however, to compare the legislation and not the intention, with the standard of the constitution.

It has not been denied that Congress may constitutionally delegate to its own courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under its own laws. It is, too, a general principle in the construction of statutes, that where a penalty is prescribed to be recovered in a special manner, in a special court, it excludes a recovery in any other mode or court. The language is deemed expressive of the sense of the legislature, that the jurisdiction shall be exclusive, in such a case, it is a violation of the statute for any other tribunal to assume jurisdiction. If, then, we strip the case before the court of all unnecessary appendages, it presents [72] this point, that Congress had declared that its own courts-martial shall have exclusive jurisdiction of the offense; and the state of Pennsylvania claims a right to interfere with that exclusive jurisdiction, and to decide in its own courts upon the merits of every case of alleged delinquency. Can a more direct collision with the authority of the United States be imagined? It is an exercise of concurrent authority where the laws of Congress have constitutionally denied it. If an act of Congress be the supreme law of the land, it cannot be made more binding by an affirmative re-enactment of the same act by a state legislature. The latter must be merely inoperative and void, for it seeks to give sanction to that which already possesses the highest sanction.

What are the consequences, if the state legislation in the present case be constitutional? In the first place, if the trial in the state court-martial be on the merits, and end in a condemnation or acquittal, one of two things must follow, either that the United States court-martial are thereby divested of their authority to try the same case, in violation of the jurisdiction confided to them by Congress; or that the delinquents are liable to be twice tried and punished for the same offense, against the manifest intent of the act of Congress, the principles of the common law, and the genius of our free government. In the next place, it is not perceived how the right of the President to pardon the offense can be effectually exerted; for if the state legislature can, as the defendant contends, by its own enactment, make it a state offense, the pardoning power of the state alone purge away such an offense. [73] The President has no authority to interfere in such a case. In the next place, if the state can re-enact the same penalties, it may enact penalties substantially different for the same offense, to be adjudged in its own courts. If it possess a concurrent power of legislation, so as to make it a distinct state offense, what punishments it shall impose must depend upon its own discretion. In the exercise of that discretion, it is not liable to the control of the United States. It may enact more severe or more mild punishments than those declared by Congress. And thus an offense originally created by the laws of the United States, and growing out of their authority, may be visited with penalties utterly incompatible with the intent of the national legislature. It may be said that state legislation cannot be thus exercised, because its concurrent power must be in subordination to that of the United States. If this be true (and it is believed to be so), then it must be upon the ground that the offense cannot be made a distinct state offense, but is exclusively created by the laws of the United States, and is to be tried and punished as Congress has directed, and not in any other manner or to any other extent. Yet the argument of the defendant�s counsel might be here urged, that the state law was merely auxiliary to that of the United States; and that it sought only to enforce a public duty more effectually by other penalties, in aid of those prescribed by Congress. The repugnancy of such a state law to the national authority would, nevertheless, be manifest, [74] since it would seek to punish an offense created by Congress, differently from the declared will of Congress. And the repugnancy is not, in my judgment, less manifest where the state law undertakes to punish an offense by a state court-martial, which the law of the United States confines to the jurisdiction of a national court-martial.

The present case has been illustrated in the argument of the defendant�s counsel, by a reference to cases in which state courts under state laws exercise a concurrent jurisdiction over offenses created and punished by the laws of the United States. The only case of this description which has been cited at the bar, is the forgery of notes of the Bank of the United States, which by an act of Congress was punished by fine and imprisonment, and which under state laws has also been punished in some state courts, and particularly in Pennsylvania. 5 In respect to this case, it is to be recollected that there is an express proviso in the act of Congress, that nothing in that act should be construed to deprive the state courts of their jurisdiction under the state laws over the offenses declared punishable by that act. There is no such proviso in the act of 1795, and, therefore, there is no complete analogy to support the illustration.

That there are cases in which an offense particularly aimed against the laws or authority of the United States may, at the same time, be directed against state authority also, and thus [75] be within the legitimate reach of state legislation, in the absence of national legislation on the same subject, I pretend not to affirm, or to deny. It will be sufficient to meet such a case when it shall arise. But that an offense against the constitutional authority of the United States can, after the national legislature has provided for its trial and punishment, be cognizable in a state court, in virtue of a state law creating a like offense, and defining its punishment, without the consent of Congress, I am very far from being ready to admit. It seems to me that such an exercise of state authority is completely open to the great objections which are presented in the case before us. Take the case of a capital offense, as, for instance, treason against the United States: can a state legislature vest its own courts with jurisdiction over such an offense, and punish it either capitally or otherwise? Can the national courts be ousted of their jurisdiction by a trial of the offender in a state court? Would an acquittal in a state court be a good bar upon an indictment for the offense in the national courts? Can the offender, against the letter of the constitution of the United States, "be subject for the same offense, to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb?" These are questions which, it seems to me, are exceedingly difficult to answer in the affirmative. The case, then, put by the defendant�s counsel, clears away none of the embarrassments which surround their Construction of the case at the bar of the court.

Upon the whole, with whatever reluctance, I feel myself bound to declare that the clauses of the militia act of Pennsylvania now [76] in question, are repugnant to the constitutional laws of Congress on the same subject and are utterly void; and that, therefore, the judgment of the state court ought to be reversed. In this opinion I have the concurrence of one of my brethren.

Judgment Affirmed

Notes

1. Chirac v. Chirac, 2 Wheat. 259, 269. text@note1

2. Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 304, 337; and see The Federalist, No. 32. text@note2

3. Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat, Rep. 304, 337; S. P. United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. Rep.4. text@note3

4. Ex-parte, 5 Hall's Amer. Law Journal, 476. text@note4

5. See White v. Commonwealth, 4 Binn. Rep. 418; Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. Rep. 507, 567. text@note5