Full text of The Second Treatise: http://www.constitution.org/jl/2ndtreat.htm
§ 88. And thus the commonwealth comes by a power to set down what punishment shall belong to the several transgressions they think worthy of it, committed amongst the members of that society (which is the power of making laws), as well as it has the power to punish any injury done unto any of its members by any one that is not of it (which is the power of war and peace); and all this for the preservation of the property of all the members of that society, as far as is possible. But though every man entered into society has quitted his power to punish offences against the law of Nature in prosecution of his own private judgment, yet with the judgment of offences which he has given up to the legislative, in all cases where he can appeal to the magistrate, he has given up a right to the commonwealth to employ his force for the execution of the judgments of the commonwealth whenever he shall be called to it, which, indeed, are his own judgements, they being made by himself or his representative. And herein we have the original of the legislative and executive power of civil society, which is to judge by standing laws how far offences are to be punished when committed within the commonwealth; and also by occasional judgments founded on the present circumstances of the fact, how far injuries from without are to be vindicated, and in both these to employ all the force of all the members when there shall be need.
§ 89. Wherever, therefore, any number of men so unite into one society as to quit every one his executive power of the law of Nature, and to resign it to the public, there and there only is a political or civil society. And this is done wherever any number of men, in the state of Nature, enter into society to make one people one body politic under one supreme government: or else when any one joins himself to, and incorporates with any government already made. For hereby he authorises the society, or which is all one, the legislative thereof, to make laws for him as the public good of the society shall require, to the execution whereof his own assistance (as to his own decrees) is due. And this puts men out of a state of Nature into that of a commonwealth, by setting up a judge on earth with authority to determine all the controversies and redress the injuries that may happen to any member of the commonwealth, which judge is the legislative or magistrates appointed by it. And wherever there are any number of men, however associated, that have no such decisive power to appeal to, there they are still in the state of Nature.
§ 94. But, whatever flatterers may talk to amuse people's understandings, it never hinders men from feeling; and when they perceive that any man, in what station soever, is out of the bounds of the civil society they are of, and that they have no appeal, on earth, against any harm they may receive from him, they are apt to think themselves in the state of Nature, in respect of him whom they find to be so; and to take care, as soon as they can, to have that safety and security, in civil society, for which it was first instituted, and for which only they entered into it. And therefore, though perhaps at first, as shall be showed more at large hereafter, in the following part of this discourse, some one good and excellent man having got a pre-eminency amongst the rest, had this deference paid to his goodness and virtue, as to a kind of natural authority, that the chief rule, with arbitration of their differences, by a tacit consent devolved into his hands, without any other caution but the assurance they had of his uprightness and wisdom; yet when time giving authority, and, as some men would persuade us, sacredness to customs, which the negligent and unforeseeing innocence of the first ages began, had brought in successors of another stamp, the people finding their properties not secure under the government as then it was6 (whereas government has no other end but the preservation of property), could never be safe, nor at rest, nor think themselves in civil society, till the legislative was so placed in collective bodies of men, call them senate, parliament, or what you please, by which means every single person became subject equally with other the meanest men, to those laws, which he himself, as part of the legislative, had established; nor could any one, by his own authority, avoid the force of the law, when once made, nor by any pretence of superiority plead exemption, thereby to license his own, or the miscarriages of any of his dependants. No man in civil society can be exempted from the laws of it. For if any man may do what he thinks fit and there be no appeal on earth for redress or security against any harm he shall do, I ask whether he be not perfectly still in the state of Nature, and so can be no part or member of that civil society, unless any one will say the state of Nature and civil society are one and the same thing, which I have never yet found any one so great a patron of anarchy as to affirm.
§ 124. The great and chief end, therefore, of men uniting into
commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation
of their property; to which in the state of Nature there are many things wanting.
Firstly, there wants an established, settled, known law, received and
allowed by common consent to be the standard of right and wrong, and
the common measure to decide all controversies between them. For though
the law of Nature be plain and intelligible to all rational creatures,
yet men, being biased by their interest, as well as ignorant for want of
study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a law binding to them in the
application of it to their particular cases.
§ 125. Secondly, in the state of Nature there wants a known and indifferent
judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established
law. For every one in that state being both judge and executioner of the law
of Nature, men being partial to themselves, passion and revenge is very apt
to carry them too far, and with too much heat in their own cases, as well as
negligence and unconcernedness, make them too remiss in other men's.
§ 127. Thus mankind, notwithstanding all the privileges of the state of
Nature, being but in an ill condition while they remain in it are quickly
driven into society. Hence it comes to pass, that we seldom find any number
of men live any time together in this state. The inconveniencies that they
are therein exposed to by the irregular and uncertain exercise of the power
every man has of punishing the transgressions of others, make them take
sanctuary under the established laws of government, and therein seek the
preservation of their property. It is this that makes them so willingly
give up every one his single power of punishing to be exercised by such
alone as shall be appointed to it amongst them, and by such rules as the
community, or those authorised by them to that purpose, shall agree on.
And in this we have the original right and rise of both the legislative
and executive power as well as of the governments and societies themselves.
§ 128. For in the state of Nature to omit the liberty he has of
innocent delights, a man has two powers. The first is to do whatsoever
he thinks fit for the preservation of himself and others within the
permission of the law of Nature; by which law, common to them all, he
and all the rest of mankind are one community, make up one society
distinct from all other creatures, and were it not for the corruption
and viciousness of degenerate men, there would be no need of any other,
no necessity that men should separate from this great and natural
community, and associate into lesser combinations. The other power
a man has in the state of Nature is the power to punish the crimes
committed against that law. Both these he gives up when he joins in
a private, if I may so call it, or particular political society, and
incorporates into any commonwealth separate from the rest of mankind.
§ 129. The first power viz., of doing whatsoever he thought
fit for the preservation of himself and the rest of mankind, he gives
up to be regulated by laws made by the society, so far forth as the
preservation of himself and the rest of that society shall require;
which laws of the society in many things confine the liberty he had
by the law of Nature.
§ 130. Secondly, the power of punishing he wholly gives up, and
engages his natural force, which he might before employ in the
execution of the law of Nature, by his own single authority, as he
thought fit, to assist the executive power of the society as the law
thereof shall require. For being now in a new state, wherein he is to
enjoy many conveniencies from the labour, assistance, and society of
others in the same community, as well as protection from its whole
strength, he is to part also with as much of his natural liberty, in
providing for himself, as the good, prosperity, and safety of the
society shall require, which is not only necessary but just, since
the other members of the society do the like.
§ 131. But though men when they enter into society give up the
equality, liberty, and executive power they had in the state of
Nature into the hands of the society, to be so far disposed of
by the legislative as the good of the society shall require, yet
it being only with an intention in every one the better to
preserve himself, his liberty and property (for no rational
creature can be supposed to change his condition with an
intention to be worse), the power of the society or legislative
constituted by them can never be supposed to extend farther than
the common good, but is obliged to secure every one's property by
providing against those three defects above mentioned that made
the state of Nature so unsafe and uneasy. And so, whoever has the
legislative or supreme power of any commonwealth, is bound to govern
by established standing laws, promulgated and known to the people,
and not by extemporary decrees, by indifferent and upright judges,
who are to decide controversies by those laws; and to employ the
force of the community at home only in the execution of such laws,
or abroad to prevent or redress foreign injuries and secure the
community from inroads and invasion. And all this to be directed
to no other end but the peace, safety, and public good of the people.
§ 168. The old question will be asked in this matter of
prerogative, "But who shall be judge when this power is
made a right use of?" I answer: Between an executive
power in being, with such a prerogative, and a legislative
that depends upon his will for their convening, there can be
no judge on earth. As there can be none between the legislative
and the people, should either the executive or the legislative,
when they have got the power in their hands, design, or go about
to enslave or destroy them, the people have no other remedy
in this, as in all other cases where they have no judge on
earth, but to appeal to Heaven; for the rulers in such
attempts, exercising a power the people never put into their
hands, who can never be supposed to consent that anybody should
rule over them for their harm, do that which they have not a
right to do. And where the body of the people, or any single
man, are deprived of their right, or are under the exercise
of a power without right, having no appeal on earth they have
a liberty to appeal to Heaven whenever they judge the
cause of sufficient moment. And therefore, though the people
cannot be judge, so as to have, by the constitution of that
society, any superior power to determine and give effective
sentence in the case, yet they have reserved that ultimate
determination to themselves which belongs to all mankind,
where there lies no appeal on earth, by a law antecedent
and paramount to all positive laws of men, whether they
have just cause to make their appeal to Heaven. And this
judgement they cannot part with, it being out of a man's
power so to submit himself to another as to give him a
liberty to destroy him; God and Nature never allowing a
man so to abandon himself as to neglect his own preservation.
And since he cannot take away his own life, neither can he
give another power to take it. Nor let any one think this
lays a perpetual foundation for disorder; for this operates
not till the inconvenience is so great that the majority
feel it, and are weary of it, and find a necessity to have
it amended. And this the executive power, or wise princes,
never need come in the danger of; and it is the thing of
all others they have most need to avoid, as, of all others,
the most perilous.
§ 243. To conclude. The power that every individual
gave the society when he entered into it can never revert
to the individuals again, as long as the society lasts, but
will always remain in the community; because without this
there can be no community no commonwealth, which
is contrary to the original agreement; so also when the society
hath placed the legislative in any assembly of men, to continue
in them and their successors, with direction and authority for
providing such successors, the legislative can never revert to
the people whilst that government lasts: because, having
provided a legislative with power to continue for ever, they
have given up their political power to the legislative, and
cannot resume it. But if they have set limits to the duration
of their legislative, and made this supreme power in any
person or assembly only temporary; or else when, by the
miscarriages of those in authority, it is forfeited; upon
the forfeiture of their rulers, or at the determination of
the time set, it reverts to the society, and the people have
a right to act as supreme, and continue the legislative in
themselves or place it in a new form, or new hands, as they
think good.
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