To understand this maxim, we must consider that
three different interests center in the person
of the magistrate; his own private interest,
tending solely to his own advantage; the
interests of the magistracy, tending to the
advantage of that body; and the interest of the
whole people collectively or the supreme power.
In a perfect system of government, the interest
of the individual should have influence in
administration; that of the magistracy should be
very inconsiderable, and that of the
people should govern all others. But such is the
nature of man, that the public interest has the
least influence; the interest of the magistracy
is more powerful; and the interest of the
individual bears the principal sway. This order
is totally repugnant to the happiness of civil
government. If a society is composed of a
thousand individuals and the magistrates are
ten, the interest of the individual in any one
magistrate, is in fact but a thousandth part of
the whole and that of the magistracy but a
tenth, and yet his own interest will have the
principal sway.
[9]
While these interests are divided,
government must of course be feeble. Unite them
and government becomes active and energetic.
Suppose the executive power all vested in an
individual; the whole interest of the magistracy
is blended with that of the individual; and this
union of the two most active principles, renders
government as energetic as possible. Hence we
deduce the foregoing maxim that the number of
magistrates ought to be in an inverse proportion
to the magnitude of the state, the consequence
of which is that a monarchical form of
government is best for large states.
From the foregoing principles may learn what
forms of government are most favorable for the
liberty of the subject. No person can be said
to enjoy civil liberty, who has no share in
legislation, and no person is secure in society,
unless the laws are known and respected.
In despotic governments, where the sceptre is
swayed by an individual, the ruler, whether
denominated an Emperor, a King or a Bushaw,
having the sole right of making and executing
laws, is the only person who enjoys any liberty.
Every individual within his dominions is a
slave. In this case, the interest of the
individual, of the magistrate, and of the
supreme power, are all united, and government is
of course as active as possible. Hence the vigor
and decision of military operations, when the
power of the general is without limitation.
Despotic power is not always tyrannical; in the
hands of a mild prince, it may be favorable to
the rights of the subject. But such is the
depravity of human nature, that it is madness in
a people to vest such power in an individual.
Denmark furnishes the only instance of absolute
power conferred on an individual by the solemn
act of the people; and it furnishes perhaps the
only instance of absolute power that has not
been abused.
A limited monarchy, where the power of the
sovereign is restrained by certain laws, is far
preferable to despotism. But the monarch has the
power of making any laws, the people are
so far slaves. However such
[10]
power may be sanctified by time, custom or
hereditary succession, the exercise of it, in a
single instance, is an act of tyranny. The king
of Great-Britain cannot make a single law
binding upon his subjects, but he can defeat
every bill that is proposed by parliament.
Is such a nation free? The English boast of
their privileges, and with some reason, when
they draw a comparison between themselves and
the vassals of a Polish nobleman. But when
compared with the eternal immutable rights of
man, their privileges shrink into
insignificance. With what face can a nation
boast of their liberties, when an individual of
that nation can, with a single expression,
the king will consider it, defeat any
measure that the parliament may adopt? Neither
the title nor the dignities of royalty can make
a king more honest or less fallible than another
man; and upon the principles of natural right,
any member of parliament might as well negative
an act of that body, as the king. A nation
which is subject to the will of an individual is
a nation of slaves; whether that nation receives
its laws from the arbitrary will of its
sovereign, or whether the people reserve to
themselves the right of making their own laws
and give their sovereign full power to
annihilate them at pleasure. In either case a
nation is at the mercy of an individual.*
An aristocracy is a form of government of all
others the most to be dreaded; I mean, where the
right of legislation is vested in a hereditary
nobility. The idea of being born a
legislator, is shocking to common sense, and
the fact is a reproach to human nature. In such
a government, the interest of the people is out
of question. The interest of the supreme power,
of the magistracy, and of the individual are
here blended, and they are distinct and
independent of the interest of the people. The
consequence is, that when these interests
coincide in
*the sole exclusive right of levying taxes is
vested in the house of commons; and is the only
constitutional privilege of legislation in the
English nation; unless we rank the right of
dethroning and electing their king for
mal-administration, among their constitutional
privileges.
[11]
all the members of the legislature, they are
combined to oppress their subjects, and when
they clash, as often happens the state is torn
with dissensions and civil war.
From the preceding consideration, I deduce this
definition of the most perfect practicable
system of government; a government, where the
right of making laws, is vested in the
greatest number of individuals, and the power of
executing them, in the smallest number.
In large communities, the individuals are too
numerous to assemble for the purpose of
legislation for which reason, the people appear
by substitutes or agents; persons of their own
choice. A representative democracy seems
therefore to be the most perfect system of
government; that is practicable on earth.
Governments on the Eastern
Continent.
It will be laid that I have described a system of
government, excellent in theory, but
impracticable. It will be alleged that all
kinds of government have been attempted by
mankind, and that all the efforts of knowledge
and virtue have proved ineffectual to preserve
the rights of men, from the grasp of ambition or
from the gradual approaches of corruption.
I will not undertake to assert that a perfect
system of civil polity can be established on
earth. All human institutions must be imperfect.
Nor will I venture to predict, that a form of
government, so founded on the true principles of
natural right; on the broad basis of civil and
religious liberty, can be permanent in the
fluctuation of human events. But I dare assert
that no nation, of which history gives us any
account, was ever in a situation to make the
experiment; and that there is nothing in the
nature of things to render such an event
impossible.
[12]
To prove this it will be necessary to take a
general view of the constitutions of government
that have been most famous, either for their
principles, their continuance, or their effects
upon the happiness of society.
The three original principles which have
operated generally to preserve union and
subordination in society, are, the power of a
standing army, the fear of an external
force, and the influence of religion. In
despotic governments, under which nine tenths of
the human race are included, a standing army at
the command of the sovereign, has been generally
established, for the purpose of enforcing
obedience to his arbitrary edicts. It is
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for a
monarch to support his authority and maintain
tranquility in his dominions, for any long
period, without a military force. There is
something in the idea of such a government
repugnant to the feelings of mankind; and a
people must be totally depressed by servitude
and stupified by ignorance not to feel a
perpetual disposition to rebel. Besides, there
is such an unconquerable inclination in human
nature, unchecked by fear, to be supercilious
and tyrannical, that few monarchs have swayed
the sceptre for a long time, without giving
their subjects the most justifiable grounds for
insurrection.
In order therefore to secure the obedience of
subjects, the terrors of religion have always
been called in to aid the civil power, and in
most countries, have been incorporated with the
political institutions. It has been the policy
of the sovereign to keep his subjects in
ignorance, to teach them a blind obedience to
the oracles of some deity, commonly fabricated
or feigned by human contrivance, to impress
their minds with the belief that their rulers
and priests were beings of a superior order, who
had some intercourse with their gods and had
power to punish disobedience with the severest
judgments. All the events of the natural world,
earthquakes, thunder and lightning, eclipse,
storms and famine, with the whole catalogue of
imaginary prodigies, miracles, dreams, tricks of
magic, and fabulous stories of demons,
[13]
have been converted, by power and artifice;
into instruments of tyranny. Thus mankind have
been deluded from age to age and rendered
subservient to the caprice, the pleasure and the
ambition of their sovereigns.
These two instruments of despotism,
superstition and a military force, command peace
and subordination in all the kingdoms and
empires on the eastern continent. Some states,
both in ancient and modern times, have been
united by the fear of an external force. The
states of Greece were obliged to combine for
their mutual safety against the Persians; but
when delivered from a foreign invasion, they
were distracted with civil wars. Rome was never
free from faction and tumult, for a long period,
unless she was invaded or her armies were
employed in foreign conquests. The Helvetic body
was formed and is still preserved by the danger
of conquest. Composed of several states,
differing in religion and principles of
government, and inhabited by a hardy race of
men, there is no reason to suppose that their
union could be of long duration, without a dread
of falling victims to the house of Bourbon or
Austria.
The same principle united the American States
and answered, during the period of danger, all
the purposes of a vigorous government.
It will be observed that I have not mentioned
the influence of a wise system of laws and a
regular administration, among the causes of
peace and subordination. An established code of
laws and tribunals of justice may prevent the
crimes of individuals and small disturbances;
but seldom or never prevent civil dissensions
and we know of very few instances where the
civil magistrate has been able, without the aid
of a military force, to suppress a popular
insurrection. On the contrary, history informs
us, that those nations which have enjoyed the
wisest system of laws, and have been most
distinguished by liberty and knowledge, have
been the most frequently involved in civil wars.
This effect, however, is not the natural
consequence of laws, science or freedom, but
the inevitable consequence of defective
constitutions. We ought
[14]
always to keep in mind the material
distinctions between the constitution,
the laws and the administration of
a government. Several nations, ancient and
modern, furnish us with most excellent systems
of law; all nations of any consequence furnish
us with the most illustrious examples of
upright, judicious magistrates; but history has
not recorded a single instance of a wise
constitution of civil government. Singular
as this assertion may appear, I, believe it may
be clearly demonstrated.
To prove this fact, it is not necessary to
mention despotic governments; these being so
evidently an inversion of the order of society
and an infraction of the sacred rights of men,
that they can have few advocates in America. I
will make a few remarks on those forms of
government that have been most celebrated for
freedom.
Much has been said of the republics of
Greece, Athens and Sparta. Their freedom, their
valour, their disinterested patriotism, their
literature, their arts, have been the subjects
of endless panegyrick. But what were their
governments? Before the days Solon and
Lycurgus, their laws were extremely rude and
barbarous. The supreme power was the people at
large; who, being under no restraint, having no
settled form of deliberation, and being at the
same time illiterate and credulous, were
generally at the command of some noisy
demagogue. In such a popular assembly, it could
not be expected that justice or policy would
always direct the suffrages of the people. On
the contrary, their public acts of legislation
were capricious and irregular; guided by no
rules and changed by every artful harangue. They
would unanimously adopt a measure one day and as
unanimously, rescind it the next, without any
change of circumstances. They would execrate and
banish an illustrious personage, at the
instigation of his artful enemy, and within a
month, recall and receive him, with
demonstrations of joy, without any change in his
character. In the early ages of Greece, her
citizens were indeed free, but their freedom was
licentiousness. Solon and Lycurgus are
celebrated as lawgivers; but they ought also to
be condemned
[15]
as tyrants. They framed many wise regulations
but they enacted cruel laws too, and imposed
them upon their countrymen with a rigor known
only to arbitrary governments.
The same remarks will apply to the Roman state.
A banditti of robbers, who lived by plunder, so
ended the greatest empire on earth. The first
form of government which they established, was
the monarchical. On the abolition of monarchy,
there among a heterogeneous form of government,
in which the intersecting of opposite interests
introduced every species of disorder. The
patricians or nobility, who were defendants of
the ancient senators, who formed a respectable
council under the regal state, claimed
privileges distinct and superior to the body of
the people, who were denominated plebeian; these
two orders, constantly struggling for
prerogative and right, kept the Roman state in a
perpetual ferment. The plebeians were certainly
right in maintaining their privileges; but as it
ever happens in popular transaction, their
frenzy transported them at times beyond all
bounds. The principles of the Gracchi were
undoubtedly right, but they urged them too far
and their noble attempts to save the rights of
the people ended in bloodshed. The agrarian law
was so ended on true principles of natural
right; but it should have been a part of the
constitution; a different system had prevailed
and had become too firmly established to be
overthrown by any means but the sword.
A state where there are two district orders of
men, one claiming hereditary honours and
offices, can not with propriety be called a
republic, or free government. Such a
state, when the rights of each order are
precisely defined and ascertained in the
constitution and while the privileges of a
hereditary nobility, which are always
encroachments on the natural rights of men, have
been sanctified by long possession, may enjoy
tolerable tranquility under a prudent
administration. But was the misfortune of the
Romans to have no established constitution.
There was no fixed line of discrimination
between the
[16 ]
ancient privileges of the Patricians and the
rights of the Plebeians. Hence the insolence of
the former and the jealousy of the latter
incessantly embroiled the state. Treaties and
temporary concessions, with some attempts to
compromise differences by a code of laws and the
establishment of new officers among the
Plebeians, had some effect in suspending the
dissensions which from time to time disturbed
the peace of the state. But no application of
partial remedies can elect a radical cure in a
disordered constitution. Excellent laws and wise
magistracy may palliate, but can never remove
the disorders that proceed from defects in the
original frame of government. The discord which
rent the Roman state, was the inevitable, the
necessary consequence of a constitutional
separation of interests; and could not cease,
till these interests were blended together, or
the interest of one party was annihilated or
silenced by superior force. This last event took
place in Rome. An ambitious general, at the head
of a veteran army, which had been accustomed to
conquer, destroyed the liberties of the people,
in a single day, on the plains of Pharsalia. The
privileges of the senate were apparently
respected for several hundred years; but a
standing army at the command of the emperor, in
effect annihilated their power, and they
gradually lost both their name and existence.
A similar progress is observable in all those
states which have been called free, and which
have been composed of different orders of men.
In Rome the conceit was long and attended with
alternate advantages. In Spain, the power and
artifice of Cardinal Ximenes, prime minister to
Charles V put an end to the liberties of the
people, in the short period of a single reign.
In France absolute power made more gradual
advances, but was established. In Sweden there
have been several revolutions, and the last,
which happened but a few years past, was in
favor of monarchy. Denmark has been mentioned as
a singular instance of a despotic government
established by the solemn resolution of the
people. In England there have been the most
[17]
vigors exertions in opposition to the
encroachments of tyranny, and those exertions
have been attended with the best success. But in
defiance of all the efforts of a brave and
enlightened nation, the body of the people is
reduced to a situation, little or nothing
superior to the vassalage of the neighboring
nations. The United Provinces, taught by fatal
experience, the evils of a despotic government,
framed on their emancipation from Spain, a
constitution, distinguished by the most
extraordinary jealousy. The supreme power, not
deliberation brought to a point, but remaining
in several separate assemblies, is destitute of
all energy. Their measures are always now and
commonly ineffectual. In cases of extreme
danger, the states general have been obliged to
infringe the constitution to save the provinces
from ruin. And after all their jealousy, they
have lost the rights of a free people, by their
own folly; and their present form of government
is a kind of divided commercial aristocracy,
without the benefits of a popular representation
or the security of an energetic administration.
The republics of Italy, if they ever enjoyed
freedom, are now aristocracies, of the worst
kind. Several cities of Germany have obtained
and still preserve very extensive civil
privileges, but their religious establishments
have depressed the human mind. The present
emperor the most amiable and illustrious prince
in Europe, not even excepting the generous Louis
XVIth, is unfettering his subjects, and many
material changes are already introduced into his
dominions. But the subjects of the princes of
the empire are the most abject slaves.
The form of government in some of the Swiss
Cantons is aristocratical; in others, it is said
to be republican. I am not sufficiently informed
to determine in my own mind, whether the
constitutions of any of these small states or of
their allies, are founded on principles of equal
liberty. From the most accurate accounts we have
of their internal police, I believe we may
venture to say, that some of these cantons and
the city of Geneva, enjoy greater share of civil
and religious liberty, than any other state or
kingdom on the eastern continent.
[18]
If these remarks on the several constitutions of
civil government, ancient and modern, are
allowed to be just, we are prepared to enumerate
their general defects and the causes that have
contributed to change their form to the
monarchical or aristocratical, or to a mixture
of both.
The great fundamental principle on which alone
a free government can be founded and by which
alone the freedom of a nation can be rendered
permanent, is an equal distribution of property.
The reverse of this, an unequal distribution of
lands, has been the cause of almost all the
civil wars that have torn society in pieces,
from the infancy of the Roman republic down to
the revolution in England. I here speak of that
unequal division of property which is perpetual
and to which are annexed certain hereditary
offices and dignities. Commerce creates very
great inequality of property; but as this
inequality is revolving from person to person
and entitles the possessor to no pre-eminence in
legislation, it is not dangerous to the
liberties of the rest of the state.
The first remarkable instance of the evils
which follow from hereditary distinctions, we
have exhibited in the history of Rome. This
state, had we no other instance, would be a
sufficient proof that no freedom can be of long
duration, and that no society can enjoy long
tranquility, where hereditary honours and
superiority of birth are claimed by one part of
the members to the exclusion of the rest. But
the whole history of modern Europe is but a
continued confirmation of this truth.
By the establishment of feuds in all the
territories conquered by the warlike nations of
the north; that curious military system, which
discovers the spirit of those barbarous tribes,
and was well calculated to preserve their
conquests; by the establishment of this system
throughout Europe, the wretched inhabitants were
chained in perpetual vassalage, from which
neither power nor policy has been able to
deliver a single state. The governments that
were erected upon this system, were of the mixed
kind, the monarchical and the aristocratical.
The Barons,
[19]
who were lords of the soil, and could command
the service of their tenants when they pleased,
were originally the possessors of all the civil
power. But it was the policy and the ambition of
their kings to abridge their power and humble
their pride. This could not be effected but by
enlarging the privileges of the people and thus
attaching them to the crown. In this manner and
by the edge of the sword, the enormous power of
the nobility was much circumscribed in every
European kingdom, except Poland; and in most of
them the people obtained a share in legislation.
In England, the people, sword in hand, obtained
from king Stephen [sic] and the Barons, magna charta
the great basis of all the freedom that was ever
enjoyed in that kingdom. Their subsequent
struggles were attended with much violence, but
generally terminated in the acquisition of new
privileges.
We have seen in what manner the people in all
the kingdoms of Europe, have been divested of
their legislative privileges, in England alone
the people still possess a shadow of legislative
importance. But how is the nation represented in
parliament? Englishmen themselves answer this
question. A few thousands of the dregs of the
people, whose votes are sold to the highest
bidder, elect the members of that supreme
council of the nation. In some boroughs, seven
or eight electors choose two members, and in
London seven thousand electors choose but four
representatives. With such unequal
representation, no nation can enjoy real
liberty, whatever may be their pretentions. But
this is not the greatest evil. One part of the
legislature consists of lords spiritual and
temporal, who sit in the house of peers by
birth, by title, or by office. This branch of
the legislature can negative any bill proposed
by the commons. Where then is the supreme power
of the people? Not to mention the absurdity of
blending the civil and the ecclesiastical
powers; two distinct orders that ought never to
be combined. To complete this glorious free
constitution, a single person,
[20]
cloathed with royalty indeed, but neither wiser
nor better for his dignity, has full power to
negative every act of parliament and disappoint
all the measures of national wisdom.
Whenever a man or body of men establish to
themselves a share in government, independent of
the people, and when they are no longer
responsible for their conduct, a state may bid
adieu to its freedom. This was the case with
almost all the states of Europe. The Cortes of
Spain, the parliaments of England and France,
the states of Denmark and Sweden, were all
composed of different orders of men who claimed
distinct privileges. The king, the nobility, the
clergy, the burghers and the peasants formed a
motley legislature. The principles, the manners,
the interests and the feelings of these orders
were so discordant, that it was utterly
impossible for them to act in concert, without
frequent concessions on one side and the other,
which must injure their rights or wound their
pride. The prerogatives of a king, the insolence
of a baron or the bigotry of an ecclesiastic,
have let whole nations butchering each other.
Let a man read the history of the civil wars in
France, the contest between the houses of York
and Lancaster, and the usurpation of Cromwell in
England, and these alone will make him execrate
the people who execrated or tolerated
distinction but that of merit, or that which is
created or annihilated by their own voluntary
choice.
Another most capital defect in all the
pretended free governments of Europe, is the
establishment or preference, given to some
religious persuasion. Next to the feudal system,
the establishment of religions has done the most
mischief of any event or institution on earth.
Both these systems were united in the dark ages
of Europe, amid the terrors of superstition were
added to the sword of the civil magistrate, to
depress the mind and bind the human race in
extreme servitude.
I shall not mention the particular defects that
are to be found in various constitutions of
civil government. An unequal distribution of
property, the perpetuity of estates,
[21 ]
hereditary distinctions and offices, with
religious establishments, are alone sufficient
to destroy the liberties of a state and support
any system of domination however absurd or
oppressive. One or all of these evils are
interwoven into every government in Europe,
unless some of the cantons of Switzerland, or
some small cities should be exceptions.
The reason why such absurd systems should ever
have prevailed is doubtless this: The basis of
every constitution of civil government on the
eastern continent, was laid by barbarians, in
whom the military spirit was predominant. The
feudal system, a most excellent institution
among savages who have neither money nor
standing forces, but subversive of all the
rights of civil society, was introduced into the
southern provinces of Europe, by those martial
tribes who overwhelmed the Roman empire. This
distribution of property and the papal system of
ecclesiastical tyranny, held Europe for several
centuries in slavery and barbarism. Upon the
revival of literature and the arts, the most
violent efforts were made in every part of
Europe to shake off the yoke. These efforts were
productive of every species of calamity to
mankind— civil wars, treachery and
assassination but they generally terminated in
some acquisitions favorable to civil and
ecclesiastical liberty. The power of a haughty
nobility was abridged; the prerogatives of kings
were ascertained; oppressive military tenures
were abolished, and in their place were
substituted rents that were certain and fixed by
contract; while in some kingdoms the peasants
obtained a share in legislation.
But however the rigors of the military services
have been mitigated and some valuable religious
rights have been acquired; still the effects of
the feudal and papal systems are visible in all
the European countries. It was impossible that
such absurd and abusive systems could remain
unattacked in the ages of intellectual
improvement; but it is extremely difficult, if
not impossible, to overthrow constitutions,
generally established and grown venerable by
time. All that Europeans can do is to introduce
[22]
gradual alterations, and from time to time make
such amendments as circumstances will permit,
and the rights of mankind require. But the
rights of primogeniture, hereditary rights of
legislation, and systems of religion established
by law, those institutions and customs that
infringe all the sacred rights of mankind, and
reproach human nature, are perhaps become too
closely connected with the peace of society, to
be abolished, either by a single stroke of
power, or the gradual improvements of policy.
From the foregoing considerations, we may
deduce with certainty this conclusion, that no
society of men has ever been in a situation to
form a perfect or even an excellent system of
civil polity. All the governments of Europe,
Asia and Africa have been planned by rude
uncivilized nations. Edifices built by such
unskilled hands must be imperfect and uncouth.
Modern architects may supply a pillar, cover a
defect or add ornaments to such an edifice; but
they can neither render it convenient nor
elegant, without rasing the whole structure to
the foundation.
From the foregoing remarks, we may likewise
learn the propriety of distinguishing between
the laws and the constitution of a state.
Englishmen seem to overlook this distinction and
lavish those praises on their glorious free
constitution, which are due to an excellent
code of laws that the English constitution is
preferrable to that of Poland or of Spain, will
not be disputed; but the subjects of several
monarchies on the continent, are happier, under
a wise prince, than Englishmen have generally
been with all their freedom. But those defects
which I have repeatedly mentioned in the course
of these observations, which were introduced
into England by its conquerors, are so
interwoven into government, that they are
gradually undermining and will eventually
destroy all the liberty that remains in that
kingdom. Commerce, which is the support of
liberty, will protract the period of despotism;
but corruption and the power of some ambitious
prince will some time or other put an end even
to
[23]
their pretended privileges. Wise laws and
upright administration may correct temporary and
accidental evils; but can never reform a
fundamental error, as an anodyne will alleviate
the pains of a disease; but will not effect a
radical cure.
Thus the inhabitants of the eastern continent
are mostly chained in vassalage— without
knowledge, without freedom and without hope of
relief.
American States.
THE theory of civil
government and the general description of the
kingdoms and states in Europe and Asia, which
have been exhibited in the preceding pages, are
designed as introductory to some remarks on the
American states.
A tolerable acquaintance with history and a
small knowledge of the English settlements on
this continent, teach us that the situation of
these states, in every point of view, the
reverse of what has been the infant situation of
all other nations.
In the first place, our constitutions of civil
government have been framed in the most
enlightened period of the world. All other
systems of civil polity have been begun in the
rude times of ignorance and savage ferocity;
fabricated at the voice of necessity, without
science and without experience. America, just
beginning to exist in an advanced period of
human improvement, has the science and the
experience of all nations to direct her in
forming plans of government. By this advantage
she is enabled to supply the defect and avoid
the errors incident to the policy of uncivilized
nations and today a broad basis for the
perfection of human society. The legislators of
the American states are neither swayed by a
blind veneration for an independent clergy, nor
[24]
nor awed by the frowns of a tyrant. Their civil
policy is or ought to be the result of, the
collected wisdom of all nations, and their
religion, that of the Savior of mankind. If they
do not establish and perpetuate the best systems
of government on earth, it will be their own
fault, for nature has given them every advantage
they could desire.
In the next place, an equal distribution of
landed property, is a singular advantage, as
deliberation the foundation of republican
governments and the security of freedom.* The
New-England states are peculiarly happy in this
respect. Lands descend equally to all the heirs
of the deceased possessor and perpetuities are
entirely barred. In Connecticut the eldest male
heir inherits two shares; this is a relique of
ancient prejudice in favor
*Several writers on government and particularly
the great Montesquieu, maintain that
virtue is the foundation of republics.
If, by virtue, is meant patriotism, or
disinterested public spirit, and love of one's
country, as is probably the case; with the
utmost respect for such authorities, I must deny
that such a general principle ever did or ever
can exist in human society. Local attachments
exist under every species of government. They
are as strong in monarchies as in republics.
Honor, which is said to be the principle of
monarchical governments, is often as powerful a
motive in republics. The real principle that is
predominat in every individual and directs all
his actions is self-interest. This operates
differently and takes different names in
different forms of government. In a democracy,
where offices and preferment are at the disposal
of the people, an ambitious man must court the
people, by his condescension, by public acts of
beneficence, and by pretentions to public good.
In order to retain any emoluments, which he
holds by the choice of the people, his conduct
must be agreeable to them, and apparently, if
not really for their interests. This conduct
springs from self-love, but takes the name of
virtue or public spirit. In a monarchy, where
the sovereign disposes of posts of honor and
profit, and where distinction of rank takes
place, a candidate takes a different method to
procure favor. He professes the most unshaken
loyalty, and a firm attachment to the person of
his sovereign; he assumes an air of dignity and
shapes his conduct to the humour of the court.
This is the same selfish principle, aiming at
the same object; but operating in a different
manner, it is denominated honor. But the
existence of any form of government does not
depend on any principle of action, however
modified, or by whatever name distinguished.
[25]
of the rights of primogeniture, which the
wisdom of succeeding legislatures will
undoubtedly abolish. An act passed the
legislature of NewYork, a few years past,
destroying and barring entailments and ordering
that all intestate estates should descend to all
the heirs in equal portions. No act was ever
better timed or calculated to produce more
salutary effects. The states of Pennsylvania and
North Carolina have made it an article in their
Constitutions, that no estates shall be
perpetual. I am not sufficiently acquainted with
the constitutions of the other states, to inform
whether perpetuities are barred or not; but they
may be avoided by a common recovery, a fiction
often practiced in the English courts of law.
But although the southern states possess too
much of the aristocratic genius of European
governments, yet it is probable that their
future tendency will he towards republicanism.
For if the African slave trade is prohibited, it
must gradually diminish the large estates which
are entirely cultivated by slaves; as these will
probably decrease without recruits from Africa.
And it is not probable that their place can be
supplied by white people, so long as vast
tracts of valuable land are uncultivated; and
poor people can purchase the fee of the soil.
But should the present possessors of lands
continue to hold and cultivate them, still there
is a new set of men springing up in the back
parts of those states; more hardy and
independent than the peasants of the low
countries; and more averse to aristocracy. The
unhealthiness of the climate in the flat lands,
is a circumstance that will contribute to the
rapid population of the mountains where the air
is more salubrious.
The idea therefore that the genius of the
southern states is verging towards
republicanism, appears to the supported by
substantial reasons. It is much to be wished
that such an idea might be well grounded, for
nature knows no distinctions, and government
ought to know none, but such as are merited by
personal vertues.
The confiscation of many large estates in every
part of the union, is another circumstance
favorable to an
[26]
equal distribution of property. The local
situation of all the states and the genius of
the inhabitants in most of them, tend to destroy
all the aristocratic which ideas were introduced
from our parent country.
Necessarily connected with an equal
distribution of landed property, is the
annihilation of all hereditary distinctions of
rank. Such distinctions are inconsistent with
the nature of popular governments. Whatever
pretensions some states have made to the name of
republics; yet those that have permitted
perpetual distinctions of property, and
hereditary titles of honor with a right of
legislation annexed, certainly never deserved
the name of popular governments; and they have
never been able to preserve their freedom.
Wherever two or more orders of men have been
established with hereditary privileges of rank,
they have always quarrelled till the power or
intrigues of the superior orders, have divested
the people of all their civil liberties. In some
countries they retain a show of freedom,
sufficient to amuse them into obedience; but in
most states, they have lost even the appearance
of civil rights.
Congress, aware of the tendency of an unequal
division of property and the evils of an
aristocracy or a mixed form of government, have
inserted a clause in the articles of
confederation, forever barring all titles of
nobility in the American states; a precaution
evincive equally of the foresight, the integrity
and the republican principles of that august
body*.
*The jealousy even of the southern states in
regard to the establishment of rank and
hereditary titles, was remarkable in the
opposition which appeared against the
Cincinnati. The original design of that
society, was not only harmless, but extremely
laudable. It was a monument raised to the memory
of an army which desended the noblest cause ever
undertaken by man. But perhaps the plan involved
in it consequences which were not apprehended by
the gentlemen who formed it. There is however
some difficulty in conceiving how a mere title,
without property and legislative rights, could
endanger our liberties. Evil consequences might
result from such a society; but they must be
extremely remote. It must require the continued
efforts of several generations to accumulate a
dangerous degree of power in a society,
consisting of few members, who would be
scattered throughout the continent.
[27]
Another circumstance, favorable to liberty and
peculiar to America, is a most liberal plan of
ecclesiastical policy. Dr. Price has anticipated
most of my observations on this head. If sound
sense is to be found on earth, it is in his
reasoning on this subject. The American
constitutions are the most liberal in this
particular of any on earth; and yet some of them
have retained some badges of bigotry. A
profession of the Christian religion is
necessary in the states, to entitle a man to
office. In some states, it is requisite to
subscribe certain articles of faith. These
requisitions are the effect of the same
abominable prejudices, that have enslaved the
human mind in all countries; which alone have
supported error and all absurdities in religion.
If there are any human means of promoting a
millenial state of society, the only means are a
general diffusion of knowledge and a free
unlimited indulgence given to religious
persuasions, without distinction and without
preference. When this event takes place, and I
believe it certainly will, the best religion
will have the most advocates. Nothing checks the
progress of truth like human establishments.
Christianity spread with rapidity, before the
temporal powers interferred; but when the civil
magistrate undertook to guard the truth from
error, its progress was obstructed, the
simplicity of the gospel was corrupted with
human inventions, and the efforts of Christendom
have not yet been able to bring it back to its
primitive purity.
The American states have gone far in assisting
the progress of truth; but they have stopped
short of perfection. They ought to have given
every honest citizen an equal right to enjoy his
religion and an equal title to all civil
emoluments, without obliging him to tell his
religion. Every interference of the civil power
in regulating opinion, is an impious attempt to
take the business of the Deity out of his own
hands; and every preference given to any
religious denomination, is so far slavery and
bigotry. This is a blemish in our constitutions,
reproachful in proportion to the light and
knowledge at our legislators.
[ 28 ]
The general education of youth is an article in
which the American states are superior to all
nations. In Great Britain the arts and sciences
are cultivated to perfection but the instruction
of the lower classes of people is by no means
equal to the American yeomanry. The institution
of schools, particularly in the New England
states, where the poorest children are
instructed in reading, writing and arithmetic,
at the public expense, is a noble regulation,
calculated to dignify the human species.
This institution is the necessary consequence
of the genius of our governments; at the same
time, it forms the firmest security of our
liberties. It is scarcely possible to reduce an
enlightened people to civil or ecclesiastical
tyranny. Deprive them of knowledge, and they
sink almost insensibly in vassalage. Ignorance
cramps the powers of the mind, at the same time
that it blinds men to all their natural rights.
Knowledge enlarges the understanding, and at the
same time, it gives a spring to all the
intellectual faculties, which direct the
deliberations of the cabinet and the enterprizes
of the field. A general diffusion of science is
our best guard against the approaches of
corruption, the prevalence of religious error,
the intrigues of ambition and against the open
assaults of external foes.
In the southern states education is not so
general.* Gentlemen of fortune give their
children a most liberal education and no part of
America produces, greater lawyers, statesmen and
divines; but the body of the people are
indifferently educated. In New England it is
*An officer of the New York line, in the late
war, who had an opportunity to be particularly
acquainted with the New England troops has told
me repeatedly, that he found the non-commissoned
officer in the Connecticut line, better educated
than the commissioned officiers of the New York
troops. An officer in Pennsylvania regiment,
informed me that he found many officers of the
line on their establishment who could not make
out the regimental returns. The flourishing
state of South Carolina never had an academy
till within a few months past. I cannot learn
that North Carolina has yet my kind of college
or academy. A few gentlemen send their sons to
Europe for an education.
[29]
rare to find a person who cannot read and
write; but if I am rightly informed, the case is
different in the southern states. The education,
however, of the common people in every part of
America, is equal to that of any nation; and the
southern states, where schools have been much
neglected, are giving more encouragement to
literature.
It is not my design to enumerate all the
political and commercial advantages of this
country; but only to mention some of the
characteristic circumstances which distinguish
America from all the kingdoms and states of
which we have any knowledge.
One further remark however, which I cannot
omit, is that the people in America are
necessitated, by their local situation, to be
more sensible and discerning, than nations which
are limited in territory and confined to the
arts of manufacture. In a populous country,
where arts are carried to great perfection, the
mechanics are, obliged to labour constantly upon
a single article. Every art has its several
branches, one of which employs a man all his
life. A man who makes heads of pins or springs
of watches, spends his days in that manufacture
and never looks beyond it. This manner of
fabricating things for the use and convenience
of life is the means of perfecting the arts; but
it cramps the human mind, by confining all its
faculties to a point. In countries thinly
inhabited, or where people live principally by
agriculture, as in America, every man is in some
measure an artist— he makes a variety of
utensiles, rough indeed, but such as will answer
his purposes— he is a husbandman in summer
and a mechanic in winter— he travels about
the country— he convenes with a variety of
professions— he reads public papers— he
has access to a parish library and thus becomes
acquainted with history and politics, and every
man in New England is a theologian. This will
always be the case in America, so long as their
is a vast tract of fertile land to be
cultivated, which will occasion emigration from
the states already settled. Knowledge is
diffused and genius routed by the very situation
of America.
[30]
Plan of Policy for improving the Advantages and
perpetuating the Union of the American States.
I HAVE already mentioned three principles
which have generally operated in combining the
members of society under some supreme power; a
standing army, religion and fear of an external
force. A standing army is necessary in all
despotic governments. Religion, by which I mean
superstition, or human systems of absurdity, is
an engine used in almost all governments, and
has a powerful effect where people are kept in
ignorance. The fear of conquest is an infallible
bond of union where states are surrounded by
martial enemies. After people have been long
accustomed to obey, whatever be the first motive
of their obedience, there is formed a habit of
subordination, which has an almost irresistible
influence, and which will preserve the
tranquillity of government, even when coercion
or the first principle of obedience has ceased
to operate.
None of the foregoing principles can be the
bond of union among the American states. A
standing army will probably never exist in
America. It is the instrument of tyranny and
ought to be forever banished from free
governments. Religion will have little or no
influence in preserving the union of the states.
The Christian religion is calculated to cherish
a spirit of peace and harmony in society; but
will not balance the influence of jarring
interests in different governments. As to
neighboring foes, we have none to fear; and
European nations are too wise or have too much
business at home, to think of conquering these
states.
We must therefore search for new principles in
modeling our political system. The American
constitutions are founded on principles
different from those of all nations, and we
must find new bonds of union to perpetuate the
consideration.
[31]
In the first place, there must be a supreme
power at the head of the union, tested with
authority to make laws that respect the states
in general and to compel obedience to those
laws. Such a power must exist in every society
or no man is safe.
In order to understand the nature of such a
power, we must recur to the principles explained
under the first head of these observations.
All power is vested in the people. That this is
their natural and inalienable right, is a
position that will not be disputed. The only
question is, how this power shall be exerted
to effect the ends of government. If the
people retain the power of executing laws, we
have seen how this division will destroy all its
effect. Let us apply the definition of a perfect
system of government to the American states.
The right of making laws for the United Sates,
should be vested in all their inhabitants by
legal and equal representation, and the right of
executing those laws, committed to the smalless
possible number of magistrates, chosen annually
by Congress and responsible to them for their
administration. Such a system of continental
government is perfect— it is
practicablect— and may be rendered permanent.
I will even venture to assert that such a system
may have, in legislation, all the security of
republican circumspection; and in
administration, all the energy and decision of a
monarchy.
But must the powers of Congress be increased?
This question implies gross ignorance of the
nature of government. The question ought to be,
must the American states be united? And if this
question is decided in the affirmative, the next
question is, whether the states can be said to
be united, without a legislative head? or in
other words, whether thirteen states can be said
to be united in government, when each state
reserves to itself the sole powers of
legislation? The answer to all such questions
is extremely easy. If the states propose to form
and preserve a confederacy, there must he a
supreme head, in which the power of all the
states is united.
[32]
There must be a supreme head, clothed with
the same power to make and enforce laws,
respecting the general policy of all the states,
as the legislatures of the respective states
have to make laws binding on those states,
respecting their own internal police. The truth
of this is taught by the principles of
government, and confirmed by the experience of
America. Without such a head, the states cannot
be united; and all attempts to conduct the
measures of the continent, will prove but
governmental farces. So long as any individual
state has power to defeat the measures of the
other twelve, our pretended union is but a name,
and our confederation, a cobweb.
What, it will be asked, must the states
relinquish their sovereignty and independence,
and give Congress their rights of legislation? I
beg to know what we mean by United
States. If after Congress have passed a
resolution of a general tenor, the States are
still at liberty to comply or refuse, I must
insist that they are not united; they are as
separate, as they ever were; and Congress is
merely an advisory body. If people
imagine that Congress ought to be merely a
council of advice, they will some time or other
discover their most egregious mistake. If three
millions of people, united under thirteen
different heads are to be governed or brought to
act in concert by a Resolve, That it be
recommended, I confess myself a stranger to
history and to human nature. The very idea of
Uniting discordant interests and retraining the
selfish and the wicked principles of men, by
advisory resolutions, is too absurd to have
advocated among illiterate peasants. The
resolves of Congress are always treated with
respect, and during the late war, they were
efficacious. But their efficacy proceded from a
principle of common safety which united, the
interests of all the states; but peace has
removed that principle, and the states comply
with or refuse the requisitions of Congress,
just as they please.
*if the states cannot be brought to act in
concert now, how can it be done when the number
of the states is augmented and the inhabitants
multiplied to many millions?
[33]
The idea of each state preserving its
sovereignty and independence in their full
latitude, and yet holding up the appearance of a
confederacy and a concert of measures, is a
solecism in politics that will sooner or later
dissolve the pretended Union, or work other
mischiefs sufficient to bear conviction to every
mind.
But what shall be done? what system of
government shall be framed, to guard our rights,
to cement our union and give energy to public
measures? The answers to these questions are
obvious and a plan of confederacy, extremely
easy. Let the government of the United States
be formed upon the general plan of government in
each of the several states. Let us examine the
constitution of Connecticut.
The inhabitants of Connecticut form one body
politic, under the name of the Governor and
Company of the State of Connecticut. The
whole body of freemen, in their collective
capacity, is the supreme power of the state. By
consent and firm compact or constitution, this
supreme power is delegated to representatives,
chosen in a legal manner and duly qualified.
These representatives properly assembled, make
laws, binding on the whole state; that is, the
supreme power or state makes laws binding on
itself. The supreme power and the subjects of
that supreme power are the same body of men. As
a collective body, the citizens are all an
individual; as separate individuals they are
subjects as numerous as the citizens.
When laws are enacted they are of a general
tenor; they respect the whole state and cannot
be abrogated but by the whole state. But the
whole state does not attempt to execute the
laws. The state elects a governor or supreme
magistrate and cloaths him with the power of the
whole state to enforce the laws. Under him a
number of subordinate magistrates such as judges
of courts, justices of the peace, sheriffs, etc.
are appointed to administer the laws in their
respective departments. These are commissioned
by the governor or supreme magistrate. Thus the
whole power of the state is brought to a single
point— it is united in one person.
[34]
If representation of the freemen is equal, and
the elections frequent; if the magistrates are
constitutionally chosen and responsible for
their administration, such a government is of
all others the most free and safe*. The form is
the most perfect on earth. While bills are
depending before the supreme power, every
citizen has a right to oppose them. A perfect
freedom of debate is essential to a free
government. But when a bill has been formally
debated and is enacted into a law, it is the act
of the whole state, and no individual has a
right to resist**.
But, as it has been before observed, the acts of
the supreme power must be general, it has
therefore by a general law delegated full
authority to certain inferior corporations to
make by-laws for the convenience of small
districts and not repugnant to the laws of the
state. Thus every town in Connecticut is a
supreme power for certain purposes and the
cities are invested with extensive privileges.
These corporations, for certain purposes, are
independent of the legislature; they make laws,
appoint officers and exercise jurisdiction
within their own limits. As bodies politic,
they are sovereign and independent— as
members of a large community, they are mere
subjects. In the same manner, the head of a
family, is so sovereign in his domestic economy,
but as a part of the state, he is a subject.
*People, in the choice of rulers, are too apt to
he deceived by an ******* address and a specious
show of popular virtues. I pretend not to lay
down rules for other people; but for my own
part, I will never give my vote to a man who
courts my favor. I always suspect that such a
man will be the first to betray me. Nor, will I
give my vote to men, merely because they have
been in office and it will hurt their
feelings to be neglected. Such motives appear
to me to discover weakness and a disregard to
the true principles of government. I endeavour
to give my votes to men, in whose integrity and
abilities I can repose considence— men, who
will not dispense with law and rigid justice, to
favor a friend or secure their own popularity.
When I hear people talk of elevating a man to an
office, because be comes next in course,
and he will do well enough, I suspect
they have forgot that they are freemen, and have
lost their oaths or their consciences.
**To be the act of the whole state, an act
should, strictly speaking, be assented to by
every member; but this is often impossible; the
act of the majority is therefore the most
perfect and only practicable method of
legislation.
[35]
Let a similar system of government be extended
to the United States. As towns and cities are,
as to their small matters, sovereign and
independent, and as to their general concerns,
mere subjects of the state; so let the several
states, as to their own police, be sovereign and
independent, but as to the common concerns of
all, let them be mere subjects of the federal
head. If the necessity of a union is admitted,
such a system is the only means effecting it.
However independent each state may be and ought
to be in things that relate to itself merely,
yet as a part of a greater body, it must be a
subject of that body, in matters that relate to
the whole.
A system of continental government, thus
organized, may establish and perpetuate the
confederation, without infringing the rights of
any particular state*. But the power of all the
states must be reduced to a narrow compass—
it must center in a single body of men— and
it must not be liable to be controlled or
defeated by an individual state. The states
assembled in Congress, must have the same
compulsory power in matters that concern the
whole, as a man has in his own family, as a city
has within the limits of the corporation, and as
the legislature of a state has in the limits of
that state, respecting matters that fall within
their several jurisdictions.
I beg to know how otherwise the states will be
governed as a collective body? Every man knows
by his own experience that even families are not
to he kept in subordination by recommendations
and advice. How much less then will such flimsy
things command the obedience of a whole
continent? They will not— they do not. A
single state, by non-compliance with resolves of
Congress, has repeatedly defeated the most
*such a form of Government resembles the harmony
nature in the planetary system. The moon is an
inferior planet subject to the earth. The earth
and other planets govern their secondary planets
and at the same time, are governed by the sun,
the common center of our system: And it is
highly probable that the sun may be a planet,
governed by some other great central body or
power. A gradation, similar to this, is obvious
in the animal world.
[36]
salutary measures of the states, proposed by
Congress and acceded to by twelve out of
thirteen.*
I will suppose for the present that a measure,
recommended by Congress and adopted by a
majority of the legislatures should be really
repugnant to the interest of a single state,
considered in its separate capacity. Would it be
right for that state to oppose it? While the
measure is in agitation it is the undoubted
privilege of every state to oppose it by every
argument. But when it is passed by the
concurrence of a legal majority, it is the duty
of every state to acquiesce.— So far from
resisting the measure, those very individuals,
who opposed it in debate, ought to support it in
execution.** The reason is vary plain—
society and government can be supported on no
other principles. The interest of individuals
must always give place to the interest of the
whole community. This principle of government is
not perfect, but it is as perfect as any
principle that can be carried into effect on
this side [of] heaven.
It is for the interest of the American states,
either to be united or not. If their union is
unnecessary, let Congress annihilate, or let
them be denominated a council of advice
and considered as such. They must then be
stripped of their power of making peace and war,
and of a
* The manner in which the impost of five
percent has been prevented by the state of Rhode
Island is well known. It is a disgrace to any
government on earth. That state has a local
interest in no complying with the measure. A
state impost brings more than it consumes, the
duty on goods not consumed there, is clear gain.
This a state by its local situation is enabled
to pay its debts and support government with
money collected in the neighboring states. If
such a selfish system is suffered to prevail,
let us dissolve the confederation, and let every
state make the most of its strength and
advantages by filching from its neighbors. In
such a game Rhode Island will lose.
**A delegate from Connecticut, who was in
Congress when the half-pay resolution was
debated, resolutely opposed the measure. But
when it had legally passed by a majority of
voices, he acquiesced, and has ever defended the
measure; even at the hazard of his reputation.
If there is any characteristic of an honest man
and a good subject, it is such a line of
conduct.
[37]
variety of prerogatives given them by the
articles of confederation. In this case we
ourselves and the state of Europe, should know
what kind of a being Congress is— what
dependence can be placed on their resolves—
what is the nature of the treaties which they
have made and the debts they have contracted.
But if the states are all serious in a design to
establish a permanent union, let their
sincerity, be evinced by their public conduct.
Suppose the legislature of Rhode Island had
no power to compel obedience to its laws,
but any town in that state has power to defeat
every public measure. Could any laws be rendered
effectual? Could it with propriety be called a
state? Could it be said that there was any
supreme power, or any government certainly not.
Suppose the smallest town in Connecticut had
power to defeat the most salutary measures of
the state; would not every other town rise in
arms against any attempt to exert such a power.
They certainly would. The truth of the case is,
where the power of a people is not united in
some individual, or small body of individuals,
but continues divided among the members of a
society, that power is nothing at all. This fact
is clearly proved under the first head of these
observations, and more clearly felt by our fatal
experience.
The American states, as to their general
internal police, are not united; there is
no supreme power at their head; they are in a
perfect state of nature and independence as to
each other; each is at liberty to fight its
neighbor, and there is no sovereign to call
forth the power of the continent to quell the
dispute or punish the aggressor*. It is not in
the power of the Congress— they have no
command over the militia of the states— each
state commands its own, and should any one be
disposed
*Congress ordered a number of troops to be
raised for taking possession of the frontier
posts and defending them from the savages. A
year has elapsed since this order and the troops
are now mostly at home. The enemy still hold
our forts, possess the fur trade and ravage our
new settlements. Such weakness in government is
infamy.
[38]
for civil war, the sword must settle the
contest and the weakest be sacrificed to the
strongest.
It is now in the power of the states to form a
continental government, as efficacious as the
interior government of any particular state.
The general concerns of the continent may be
reduced to a few heads; but in all the affairs
that respect the whole, Congress must have the
same power to enact laws and compel obedience
throughout the continent, as the legislatures of
the several states have in their respective
jurisdictions. If Congress have any power, they
must have the whole power of the continent. Such
a power would not abridge the sovereignty of
each state in any article relating to its own
government. The internal police of each state
would be still under the sole superintendance of
its legislature. But in a matter that equally
respects all the states, no individual state has
more than a thirteenth part of the legislative
authority, and consequently has no right to
decide what measure shall or shall not take
place on the continent. A majority of the states
must decide*; our confederation cannot be
permanent, unless found on that principle;
nay more, the states cannot be said to be
united, till such a principle is adopted
in its utmost latitude. If a single town or
precinct could counteract the will of a whole
state, would there be any government in that
state? It is an established principle in
government, that the will of the minority must
submit to that of the majority; and a single
state or a minority of states, ought to be
disabled to resist the will of the majority, as
much as a town or county in any state is
disabled to prevent the execution of a statute
law of the legislature.
It is on this principle and this alone,
that a free state can be governed; it is on this
principle alone that the American states can
exist as a confederacy of republic. Either the
several states must continue separate, totally
*Congress have been more careful of our
liberties; for the articles of confederation
ordain, that, in matters of great national
concern, the concurrence, not of seven
states, a mere majority, but of nine
should be requisite to pass a resolution.
[39]
independent, of each other, and liable to all
the evils of jealousy, dispute and civil
dissension— nay, liable to a civil war upon
any clashing of interests; or they must
contribute a general head, composed of
representatives from all the states, and vested
with the power of the whole continent to enforce
their decisions. There is no other alternative.
One of these events must inevitably take place,
and the revolution of a few years will verify
the prediction.
I know the objections that have been urged by
the supporters of faction and perhaps by some
honest men, against such a power at the head of
the states. But the objections all arise from
false notions of government or from a wilful
design to embroil the states. Many people, I
doubt not, really suppose that such power in
Congress, would be dangerous to the liberties of
the states. Such ought to be enlightened.
There are two fundamental errors, very common in
the reasonings which I have heard on the powers
of Congress. The first arises from the idea that
our American constitutions are founded on
principles similar to those of the European
governments which have been called free. Hence
people are led into a second error; which is,
that Congress are a body independent of their
constituents and under the influence of a
distinct interest.
But we have seen before that our systems of
civil government are different from all others;
founded on different principles, more favorable
to freedom and more secure against corruption.
We have no perpetual distinctions of property,
which might raise one class of men above
another, and create powerful family connections
and combination against our liberties. We suffer
no hereditary offices or titles, which might
breed insolence and pride, and give their
possessors an opportunity to oppress their
fellow men. We are not under the direction of a
bigoted clergy, who might rob us of the means of
knowledge and then inculcate on credulous minds
what sentiments they pleased not a single office
or emolument in America is held by
[40]
prescription or hereditary right; but all at the
disposal of the people, and not a man on the
continent, but drones and villains, who has not
the privilege of frequently choosing his
legislators and impeaching his magistrates for
mal-administration. Such principles form the
basis of our American governments; the first
and only governments on earth that are founded
on the true principles of equal liberty and
properly guarded from corruption.
The legislatures of the American states are the
only legislatures on earth, which are wholly
dependent on the people at large; and
Congress is as dependent on the several states,
as the legislatures are on their constituents.
The members of Congress are chosen by the
legislatures*, removable by them at pleasure,
dependant on them for subsistence and
responsible to their constituents for their
conduct. But this is not all. After having been
delegated three years, the confederation renders
them ineligible for the term of three years
more; when they must return, mingle with the
people and become private citizens. At the same
time their interest is the same with that of the
people; for enjoying no exclusive privileges but
what are temporary, they cannot knowingly enact
oppressive laws, because they involve
themselves, their families and estates in all
the mischief that result from such laws.
People therefore who attempt to terrify us with
apprehensions of losing our liberties, because
other states have lost theirs, betray an
ignorance of history and of the principles of
our confederation. I will not undertake to say
that the government of the American states will
not be interrupted or degenerate into tyranny.
But I venture to assert, that if it should, it
will be the fault of the people. If the
people continue to choose their representatives
annually and the choice of delegates to Congress
should remain upon its present footing, that
body can never
*In eleven states. In the other two, they are
elected by the people. This is a defect,
however, in the constitutions of those states,
as the delegates, when chosen by the people, are
immediately removable by the assembly and their
place may be supplied without a reason given.
The privilege of the people therefore nothing.
[41]
become tyrants. A measure partially oppressive
may be resolved upon, but while the principles
of representation, which are always in the power
of the people, remain uncorrupted, such a
measure can be of no long continuance. The best
constitution of government may degenerate from
its purity, through a variety of causes; but the
confederation of these states is better secured
than any government on earth, and less liable to
corruption from any quarter.
There is the same danger that the constitutions
of the several states will become tyrannical, as
that the principles of federal government will
be corrupted. The States in their collective
capacity have no more reason to dread an
uncontrollable power in Congress, than they have
in their individual capacity, to dread the
uncontrollable power of their own legislatures.
Their security in both instances is, an equal
representation, the dependence, the
responsibility and the rotation of their
representatives. These articles constitute the
basis of our liberties, and will be an effectual
security, so long as the people are wise enough
to maintain the principles of the confederation.
I beg leave here to observe that a state was
never yet destroyed by a corrupt or a wicked
administration. Weakness and wickedness, in the
executive department, may produce innumerable
evils; but so long as the principles of a
constitution remain uncorrupted, their vigor
will always restore good order. Every stride of
tyranny in the best governments in Europe, has
been effected by breaking over some
constitutional barriers. But where a
constitution is formed by the people and
unchangable but by their authority, the progress
of corruption must be extremely slow, and
perhaps tyranny can never be established in such
government, except upon a general habit of
indolence and vice.
What do the states obtain by reserving to
themselves the right of deciding on the
propriety of the resolutions of Congress? The
great advantage of having every measure
defeated, our frontiers exposed to savages, the
[42]
debts of the states unpaid and accumulating,
national faith violated, commerce restricted and
insulted, one state filching some interest from
another, and the whole body, linked together by
cobwebs and shadows, the jest and the ridicule
of the world. This is not a chimerical
description; it is a literal representation of
facts as they now exist. One State found it
could make some advantages by refusing the
impost. Congress have reasoned with their
legislature, and by incontrovertible proofs have
pointed out the impropriety of the refusal, but
all to no purpose. Thus one fiftieth part of the
states counteracts a measure that the other
states suppose not only beneficial, but
necessary; a measure, on which the discharge of
our public debt and our national faith, most
obviously depend. Can a government, thus feeble
and disjointed answer any valuable purpose? Can
commutative justice between the States ever be
obtained? Can public debts be discharged and
credit supported? Can America ever be respected
by her enemies, when one of her own states can,
year after year, abuse her weakness with
impunity? No, the American States, so celebrated
for their wisdom and valour in the late struggle
for freedom and empire, will be the contempt of
nations, unless they can unite their force and
carry into effect all the constitutional
measures of Congress, whether those measures
respect themselves or foreign nations.
The articles of confederation ordain, that the
public expense shall be defrayed out of a common
treasury. But where is this treasury? Congress
prescribe a measure for supplying this treasury;
but the States do not approve of the measure;
each State will take its own way and its own
time, and perhaps not supply its contingent of
money at all. Is this an adherence to the
articles of our union? It certainly is not; and
the States that refuse a compliance with the
general measures of the continent, would, under
a good government be considered as rebels. Such
a conduct amounts to treason, for it strikes at
the foundation of government.
Permit me to ask every candid American, how
society
[43]
could exist, if every man assumed the right of
sacrificing his neighbors property to his own
interest? Are there no rights to be
relinquished, no sacrifices to be made for the
sake of enjoying the benefits of civil
government? If every town in Rhode Island, even
the smallest could annihilate every act of the
legislature, could that State exist? Were such a
selfish system to prevail generally, there would
be an end of government and civil society would
become a curse. A social state would be less
eligible than a savage state, in proportion as
knowledge would be increased and knaves
multiplied. Local inconveniences and local
interests never ought to disappoint a measure of
general utility. If there is not power enough in
government to remedy these evils, by obliging
private interests to give way to public, discord
will pervade the State, and terminate in a
revolution. Such a power must exist somewhere,
and if people will quarrel with good government,
there are innumerable opportunities for some
daring ambitious genius to erect monarchy on
civil dissensions. In America, there is no
danger of an aristocracy; but the transition
from popular anarchy to monarchy, is very
natural and often very easy. If these States
have any change of government to fear, it is a
monarchy. Nothing but the creation of a
sovereign power over the whole, with authority
to compel obedience to legal measures, can ever
prevent a revolution in favor of one monarchy or
more. This event may be distant, but is not the
less certain. America, has it now in her power
to create a supreme power over the whole
continent, sufficient to answer all the ends of
government, without abridging the rights or
destroying the sovereignty of a single state.
But should the extreme jealousy of the States,
prevent the lodgment of such a power in a body
of men chosen by themselves and removable at
pleasure, such a power will inevitably create
itself in the course of events.
The confederation has sketched out a most
excellent form of continental government. The
ninth article recites the powers of Congress,
which are perhaps nearly sufficient to answer
the ends of our union, were there any method of
enforcing
[44]
their resolutions. It is there laid what powers
shall be exercised by Congress; but no penalty
is annexed to disobedience. What purpose would
the laws of a State answer, if they might be
evaded with impunity? and is there were no
penalty annexed to a breach of them? A law
without a penalty is mere advice, a
magistrate, without the power of punishing, is a
cypher. Here is the great defect
in the articles of our federal government.
Unless Congress can be vested with the same
authority to compel obedience to their
resolutions, that a legislature in any State has
to enforce obedience to the laws of that State,
the existence of such a body is entirely
needless and will not be of long duration. I
repeat what I have before said. The idea of
governing thirteen States and uniting their
interests by mere resolves and recommendation,
without any penalty annexed to a noncompliance,
is a ridiculous farce, a burlesque on
government, and a reproach to America.
Let Congress be empowered to call forth the
force of the continent, if necessary, to carry
into effect those measures which they have a
right to frame. Let the president, be, ex
officio, supreme magistrate, cloathed with
authority to execute the laws of Congress, in
the same manner as the governors of the states,
are to execute the laws of the states. Let the
superintendent of finance have the power of
receiving the public monies and issuing warrants
for collection, in the manner the treasurer has,
in Connecticut. Let every executive officer have
power to enforce the laws, which fall within his
province. At the same time, let them be
accountable for their administration. Let
penalties be annexed to every species of
mal-administration and exalted with such rigor
as is due to justice and the public safety. In
short, let the whole system of legislation, be
the peculiar right of the delegates in Congress,
who are always under the control of the people;
and let the whole administration be veiled in
magistrates as few as possible in number, and
subject to the control of Congress only.
Let every precaution be used in framing laws,
but let no part of the subjects be able to
resist the execution. Let the people keep,
and forever keep, the sovereignty of legislation
in their own representatives; but direct
themselves wholly of any right to the
administration. Let every State reserve its
sovereign right directing its own internal
affairs; but give to Congress the sole right of
conducting the general affairs of the continent.
Such a plan of government is practicable and I
believe, the only plan that will preserve the
faith, the dignity and the union of these
American states.
I shall just hint several other matters, that
may serve, in a more remote manner, to confirm
the union of these States.
Education or a general diffusion of knowledge
among all classes of men, is an article that
deserves peculiar attention. Science
liberalizes men and removes the most inveterate
prejudices. Every prejudice, every dissocial
passion is an enemy to a friendly intercourse
and the fuel of discord. Nothing can be more
illiberal
[45]
than the prejudices of the southern states
against New England manners. They deride our
manners and by that derision betray the want of
manners themselves. However different may be the
customs and fashions of different states, yet
those of the southern are as ridiculous as those
of the northern. The fact is, neither one nor
the other are the subjects of ridicule and
contempt. Particular districts have local
peculiarities; but custom gives all an equal
degree of propriety. It is remarked of the
Greeks as a great indelicacy of manners, that
they held all the world, except themselves, to
be barbarians. The people of Congo think the
world to be the work of angels; except their own
country, which they hold to be the work of the
supreme architect. The Greenlanders make a mock
of Europeans or Kablunets, as they call them.
They despise arts and sciences and value
themselves on their skill in catching fish,
which they conceive to be the only useful art.*
Just as absurd as these, are the prejudices
between the states. Education will gradually
eradicate them, and a growing intercourse will
harmonize the feelings and the views of all the
citizens.
Next to the removal of local prejudices, the
annihilation of local interests between the
States deserves their consideration. Each State
wishes to enrich itself as much as possible;
but it never ought to be done at the expense of
a neighbor. All imposts and duties upon goods
purchased of one State by another or carried in
sport of another State either by necessity or
accident, are the effect of narrow views, and of
selfish, unsociable, ungenerous principles, that
degrade any state where they operate. The States
may lay what duties they please upon
foreigners— this is no more than honest—
but they ought to consider their several
interests as one— they ought to encourage the
commerce of each other— they ought to
promote such an intercourse as will conciliate
rather than alienate each others affections.
Every injury done by any particular state to
the union, will ultimately recoil upon itself
with accumulated weight. It is the act of a
madman to sacrifice the happiness of his life to
a moment pleasure; and none but a fool would
pull the house about his ears to find a
shilling. So long as the states are making every
advantage out of each other, racking invention
to enlarge their own bounds, and augment their
wealth and respectability at each others
expense, jealousy, illwill and reproaches will
disturb the harmony of public measures and
contribute to the dissolution of the continental
connections. Not only should the states avoid
wringing property from each other by duties on
articles of commerce; but also an extension of
territory in such a manner as to create
reciprocal jealousies. All the superior
respectability that a single state gains above
*A fashionable buck in Carolina despises
literature. A man of science without address of the
beau monde, is ridiculed and placed
almost among the servants. In the southern
states, gaming, fox hunting and horse racing are
the height of ambition; industry is reserved for
slaves. In the northern states, industry and
the cultivation of the arts and science,
distinguishe the people. Which discover the
best taste?
[46]
others by its extent and wealth, detracts so
much from the strength and harmony of the union.
In order to have our union complete and
permanent, all the states should have an equal
influence in public deliberations. The want of
such equality is a capital misfortune— it had
well nigh prevented our confederation— and
has produced other sensible inconveniences.
The abolition of slavery is a matter intimately
connected with the policy of these states. The
northern states would hardly feel such an
event— the southern would at present suffer
by it more sensibly. But slavery ought to be
viewed as to its present tendency and remote
consequences. At present it is the bane of
industry and virtue. The slaves in the southern
states support luxury, vice and indolence more
than all other causes. They may enrich their
owners; but render them too often useless
members of society. Nor are slaves so profitable
as white people; for one man, who lives by his
industry, and eats hearty food, will do as much
labour as five negroes. Were the plantations
leased for small rents or the fee of the soil
vested in men who have the prospect of gain by
their labour, they would be cultivated and yield
more produce to the owners. But aside of the
detestable principle of subjecting one man to
the service of another, which dishonors a free
government, and the evil of supporting luxury
the bane of society, slavery inspires other
principles repugnant to the genius of our
American constitutions. It cherishes a spirit of
supercilious contempt— a haughty, unsocial,
aristocratic temper, inconsistent with that
equality which is the basis of our governments
and the happiness of human society.
An uniformity in the general principles of each
constitution, deserves attention. Some defects
may be found in all: I will mention but one,
which is not common to all; the exclusion of
clergymen from all civil offices. Considering
the evils that mankind have suffered from
ecclesiastics in Europe, it is no wonder that
Americans should dread their power. But men, in
avoiding one error, run into another. We are not
apt to attend to the difference of
circumstances. The clergy in America do not and
ought not, as a body, to form a part of
government. But why, as individuals, they should
be excluded from all the emoluments of
government, and all share of making the laws to
which they are subject, is to me inconceivable.
Merchants, mechanics and farmers as distinct
bodies, have no power, but as individuals, they
are eligible to offices of trust and profit, and
so ought to be ecclesiastics. Here is the
distinction and the reasoning applies with equal
force, to every prosession.
Must clergymen, because they are employed about
spiritual concerns, be deprived of the
privileges of society? But aside of the
flagrant injustice of such exclusion, the
measure counteracts its own end. When
ecclesiastics, as a body, are admitted to a
share of legislation, they may form combinations
dangerous to states. To prevent this danger some
states exclude them totally
[47]
from civil offices and thus make them foes to
the government by a most tyrannical distinction.
Such an exclusion therefore produces the very
effect, which it was intended to prevent. The
state of New York is a witness of this truth.
Add to this the inevitable tendency of such an
exclusion to discourage men of knowledge and
liberality from entering into a most useful and
necessary profession. Surely no State ought to
interweave, into its constitution, a general
discouragement of a profession, calculated at
least to promote the peace and happiness of
society. Should I be asked what privileges
clergymen ought to enjoy? I would answer, the
same as other citizens. This would annihilate
their power as a body, by scattering its force,
by leveling a distinction of orders, and
blending the civil and ecclesiastical interests
in one indivisible interest.
The same principle, which excludes clergymen
from civil offices, and which has introduced
test laws and subscription of creeds, into some
of the American constitutions, would have
justified the religious wars in France and
Germany; nay, the same principle would have
justified Nero and Dioclesian in extirpating
Christianity and committing the bible to the
flames. The principle would only be extended
further in one case than in the other. If there
is in the system of things, such a thing as true
religion, and a spirit of pure benevolence;
religious establishments, sacramental tests,
articles of faith, partial exclusions from
emoluments, and that illiberal pride which
sanctifies our own opinions and damns all
others, will forever banish them from human
society. Had it not been for these barriers,
invented to guard human absurdities, millions of
lives would leave been saved, and the members of
every enlightened community would have been of
one religion.
America is an independent empire, and ought to
assume a national character. Nothing can be more
ridiculous, than a servile imitation of the
manners, the language, and the vices of
foreigners. For setting aside the infancy of our
government and our inability to support the
fashionable amusements of Europe, nothing can
betray a more despicable disposition in
American, than to be the apes of Europeans. An
American ought not to ask what is the custom of
London and Paris, but what is proper for us in
our circumstance and what is becoming our
dignity? Instead of this, what is the fact? Why
every fashionable folly is brought from Europe
and adopted without scruple in our dress, our
manners and our conversation. All our ladies,
even those of the most scanty fortune, must
dress like a duchess in London; every shopkeeper
must be as great a rake as an English lord;
while the belles and the beaux,
with tastes too refined for a vulgar language
must, in all their discourse, mingle a spice of
sans souci and je ne sais quoi.
But then is no reasoning with custom nor
with fashion. We shall probably learn the arts
and virtues of Europeans; but certainly,
[48]
their vices and follies. In politics, our
weakness will render us the dupes of their power
and artifice; in manners, we shall be the slaves
of their barbers and their coxcombs.
But however important may be the remote
consequences of a corruption of manners; yet
such nearer concerns now demand our attention.
Our union is so feeble, that no provision is
made for discharging our debts. France calls for
interest and that seriously. Our credit, our
faith solemnly pledged, is at stake. Unless we
constitute a power at the head of the states,
sufficient to compel them to act in concert, I
now predict not only a dissolution of our
federal connection, but a rupture with our
national creditors. A war in Europe may possibly
suspend this event; but it most certainly take
place, unless we sacrifice our jealousy so our
true interest.
Three things demand our early and
careful attention; a general diffusion of
knowledge; the encouragement of industry,
frugality and virtue; and a sovereign power at
the head of the states. All are essential
to our peace and prosperity; but on an energetic
continental government principally depend our
tranquility at home and our respectability among
foreign nations.
We ought to generalize our ideas and our
measures. We ought not to consider ourselves as
inhabitants of a particular state only; but as
American; as the common subjects of a great
empire. We cannot and ought not wholly to divest
ourselves of provincial views and attachments;
but we should subordinate them to the general
interests of the continent. As a member of a
family, every individual has some domestic
interests; as a member of a corporation, he has
other interests; as an inhabitant of a state, he
has a more extensive interest; as a citizen and
subject of the American empire, he has a
national interest far superior to all others.
Every relation in society constitutes some
obligations, which are proportional to the
magnitude of the society. A good prince does not
ask what will be for the interest of a county or
small district in his dominions; but that will
promote the prosperity of his kingdom? In the
same manner, the citizens of this new world,
should inquire, not what will aggrandize this
town or this state; but what will augment the
power, secure the tranquility, multiply the
subjects, and advance the opulence, the dignity
and the virtues of the United States.
Self-interest, both in morals and politics, is
and ought to be the ruling principle of mankind;
but this principle must operate in perfect
conformity to social and political obligations.
Narrow views and illiberal prejudices may for a
time produce a selfish system of politics in
each state; but a few years experience will
correct our ideas of self-interest, and convince
us that a selfishness which excludes others from
a participation of benefits, is, in all cases,
self-ruin, and that provincial interest
is inseparable from national
interest.
The END.
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